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economic crisis.THERE IS NOW A DISTINCT POSSIBILITYthat this crisis will be remembered as the occasion
when Europe irretrievably lost ground, both economically and politically. 
Economically, there is a risk that, by compounding lingering demographic and economic
problems, the crisis will result in a spiral of near-stagnation, rising public debt and declining
innovation performance.   
Politically, the European Union is at risk of being blamed for having fostered a liberalisation
agenda in the past rather than being praised for having promoted a coordinated response to
the crisis when it struck.   
Although Europe should be part of the answer to current economic woes, there is currently
no appetite for bold European initiatives.
For these reasons, the next European Commission will have an exceptionally difficult task. At
a time of retreat into the national sphere and disenchantment with the EU, it will need to
fight in defence of commonly agreed rules, to propose new solutions, to redefine the
European narrative, and to make the EU an effective player in a fast-transforming world. If
the Commission succeeds, it may turn the crisis into an opportunity.  If it fails, the EU may
become less relevant.  
The stakes are therefore high, and priorities will need to be set from day one.  This is why
Bruegel has decided to contribute to the debate on priorities and to prepare a series of open
memos for the attention of the new Commission. 
Our memos are intended to be strategic. They do not spell out the whole agenda awaiting the
commissioners but succinctly describe the state of affairs, outline the key challenges and
propose key priorities.  Also, the twelve memos in this volume do not cover the whole range
of policies, but focus on the most important economic questions at the EU level. 
It is impossible to boil down the findings of the memos to a few bullet points. However two
common themes emerge. 
The first theme is the need for balance between the focus on tackling the crisis and holding a
firm line on long-term challenges, which in turn have a domestic and an external dimension.
Internally, the Commission must tackle head on the growing economic and social tensions
between individual member states. Externally, it must ensure that Europe is a coherent
rather than a fragmented actor both globally and regionally in its own backyard.
The second theme is that the times call for courage. More than its predecessors, the next
Commission will be faced with the need to ward off economic nationalism and put critical
bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 6
Forewordbruegel memos to the new commission 2009 7
choices straight to the member states and the citizens of Europe. The risk of economic, social
and political relapse is just too high for a low-profile strategy to be an acceptable one.   
The memos have all been written by Bruegel scholars and their preparation has been
coordinated by Senior Fellow André Sapir. As for every Bruegel publication, each of them reflects
the views of its author(s), and there has been no intention to write  a ‘Bruegel programme’. But
the memos have been discussed extensively within the team and therefore provide a
reasonably coherent picture of what needs to be done.
Throughout the preparation of this volume, Bruegel’s editor Andrew Fielding has contributed
considerably to improving the formal and substantive quality of the individual memos. Our
gratitude goes to him as well as to all of those who have given feedback on drafts of specific
memos.
Jean Pisani-Ferry and André Sapir
Brussels, September 2009bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 8bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 9
To: The President of the European Commission
From: Jean Pisani-Ferry and André Sapir
Subject: Priorities for your term of office
Date: 1 September 2009
For a quarter of a century each European Commission has been defined by a
paramount achievement, often in connection with a major treaty change: the
first Delors Commission is remembered for the single market; the second for
the Maastricht Treaty; the Santer Commission for the launch of the euro; the
Prodi Commission for the big enlargement to the East; and the 2004-2009
Barroso Commission will, it is to be hoped, go down in history for taking the
initiative on climate change and getting the Lisbon Treaty ratified. 
Each of these attainments was a step forward for Europe. Should the next
Commission set itself, and propose to the peoples of Europe, a similar goal?
Or should it rather accept that it will be fighting mainly to preserve past
achievements and set itself the goal of limiting the slippage? This is the main
question you should ask yourself while preparing for the next five years.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 10
Challenges
IN THINKING ABOUT THE AGENDA FOR THE NEXT FIVE
YEARSit is appropriate to depart for a moment from
current discussions and assess what Europe’s
priorities were before the crisis. Its main challenges
were essentially long term. They concerned a
number of tectonic changes that started at the end
of last century and which are likely to have a
profound impact on the twenty-first century:
globalisation and the (re)emergence of China and
India as leading economic and political powers; the
erosion of Europe’s traditional comparative
advantage in human capital and the need to foster
the development of a knowledge-based economy;
the ageing population and its consequences for
European societies and public finances; the return
of mass migration; energy security; and the need to
take decisive measures to fight climate change. At
regional level, the challenges for a largely reunified
Europe were to carry through enlargement and
redefine its relationship with its neighbours. At
global level, it was to behave as the soft but
effective power it claimed to be.
These were daunting challenges, but mostly ones
that naturally called for a common European
r e s p o n s e  a n d  w e r e  p e r c e i v e d  a s  s u c h  b y  p u b l i c
opinion. To take only a few examples, there was no
n e e d  t o  b e  a  f e d e r a l i s t  t o  a c c e p t  t h a t  c l i m a t e
change and mass migration had to be tackled at
European level, or even that only the EU could weigh
enough in international negotiations with the new
giants. The EU’s slow-moving governance
apparatus also provided an appropriate basis for
balancing the inevitable short-termism of elected
governments and the need to respond to long-term
challenges. 
Over the past ten years the EU has started to
provide structural responses to these challenges.
Enlargement has been a major achievement. On
some fronts (the knowledge society, migration or
climate change) the jury is still out, as
commitments need to be followed by acts, but at
least the agenda has been clearly set. On others
(ageing, energy security, neighbourhood, external
representation), there has barely been any move to
date, but at least the questions have been raised. 
In brief, prior to the crisis Europe had a clear agenda,
some progress had been made towards defining
and implementing it, and much more was still
needed. There was also a clear strategy for the
Commission president: to focus on the challenges
one by one, seize the intellectual high ground, set
out the risks, outline policy responses, and build
coalitions for common European solutions. At a
time when there was palpably little appetite for
major institutional initiatives, this was a practical,
results-oriented approach very much in the spirit of
the famous ‘small steps’ method.   
The crisis has brought six major changes in this
landscape: 
• First, it is making the long-term challenges faced
by Europe even more acute. At global level,
convergence between emerging and advanced
countries will doubtless accelerate as the
negative growth impact of the restructuring of
the financial sector is likely to be felt more in the
latter than in the former (which can still rely for a
while on traditional sources of growth based on
imitation). This will affect the global power
balance – in fact it has been redefined already –
but also strengthen the need for structural
adjustment in Europe, especially in the old
member states. Simultaneously, public debt in
these countries is set to increase significantly,
precisely at a moment when the effect of ageing
on public finances is starting to set in as baby-
boomers retire. This will compound pressures
linked to globalisation and have serious
implications for Europe’s social models at a time
when they are already strained by the return of
mass unemployment. 
• Second, the crisis is calling into question one of
the EU’s recent successes. The growth model of
several of the new member states, which relied
on massive capital inflows, suddenly looks
problematic. The potential for catching up
remains generally good but the path towards it is
much less assured and those of the new member
states who financed present consumption with
foreign savings will need to reassess theirbruegel memos to the new commission 2009 11
economic strategy fundamentally. IMF
intervention within the EU for the first time in
three decades highlights the seriousness of the
situation and Europe’s limited ability to address
its own difficulties. In some of the new member
states, the dramatic revision of growth
prospects may even end up shaking the existing
consensus in favour of European integration.
• Third, extensive state intervention to assist
sectors in distress is creating tensions between
the logic of European economic integration and
the logic of national political accountability.
Governments that strive to prevent financial or
corporate bankruptcies are accountable to their
citizens for the use of public funds and insist
that they be used domestically, but this is in
contradiction with the very principles of EU
integration. The integrity of the single market is,
and is likely to continue, being threatened by
sectoral state support schemes during the crisis.
The most glaring problem lies in the banking
sector, which has become heavily dependent on
national budgetary support that is often
accompanied by trade-distorting measures. But
the problem also lies outside the financial sector.
It is most acute in the automobile sector, where
national intervention is designed to preserve
national jobs, often at the expense of jobs
elsewhere in Europe, but it could spread to other
sectors. 
• Fourth, the crisis is exposing fault lines in the
current European governance system. To start
with, policy integration in the financial sector
lags behind market integration and it has
become evident that the coexistence of pan-
European banks and purely national supervision
is unsustainable. As the Turner Review
commissioned by the UK government puts it,
‘sounder arrangements require either increased
national powers, implying a less open single
market, or a greater degree of European
integration’. The problem is being addressed
through enhanced coordination, but a sticking-
plaster solution won’t suffice. A related fault line
is that of crisis management: at the height of the
financial crisis in October 2008, the EU was able
to get its act together but this was largely done
outside the institutional framework. What this
episode exposed was that the EU has an
elaborate crisis-prevention system but no built-
in crisis-management capability. It is no
accident that the ECB is the only EU institution to
emerge strengthened from the crisis so far: it is a
full-fledged, unrivalled decision-maker in its
field. The dilemma the EU faces is that the crisis
has highlighted a need for further reform of its
economic governance, involving more policy
centralisation in some fields, while there is in
fact no appetite for such reforms, let alone for
devolving more powers to Brussels.    
• Fifth, the crisis risks calling into question the
very legitimacy of the European Union. Over the
past twenty years EU integration has mostly
been associated with liberalisation (although
perceptions differ from country to country).  Yet
the crisis is widely (and rightly) perceived as a
major failure of financial liberalisation,
responses to which cannot consist of mere
tinkering with regulation. The situation calls
instead for a major redefinition of the relative
roles of governments and markets, certainly in
financial markets and perhaps even in other
areas. This begs the question as to whether such
increased public intervention will take place at
the member-state or EU (or even global) level.
Ultimately the issue is, therefore, whether the
potential backlash against liberalisation will
produce a collateral backlash against the EU.
Indeed a backlash against the market could
indeed easily turn into a backlash against the
very bedrock of European economic integration,
the single market. Or will the EU be part of the
redefinition of the relative roles of states and
markets? This question leads in turn to the issue
of governance reform, and the response that is
provided to this question could have
considerable consequences for the EU itself.
• Sixth, a remarkable feature of the reaction to the
crisis so far is that the international community
has responded to it with a strengthening ofbruegel memos to the new commission 2009 12
global governance. This has helped maintain the
integrity of international economic relations
while alleviating the effects of the shock in the
hardest-hit countries. The EU, which sees itself
as a natural champion and a laboratory of global
governance, strongly supports the process
initiated with the first two G20 summits. Yet
assuming this spirit of global coordination
proves durable, it will not be without difficulty for
the EU, which is only partially equipped for
acting as an effective global player and more
than often behaves as a ‘fragmented power’. A
lasting revival of global governance – and the
redistribution of global institutional power this
would necessarily imply – would expose the
weaknesses of European external
representation and governance and could
become a double-edged sword. For the larger
member states, coordination at G20 level could
become a substitute for coordination at EU level.
Whether the EU ends up as a player or a taker in
the global governance game may have crucial
implications for its future.
You will have to redefine the EU narrative. Citizens need to know
what is the raison d’êtreof the EU. The outgoing Commission has
not been successful in demonstrating what the EU stands for.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 13
A strategy
YOUR FIRST TASK will be to deal with the
consequences of the crisis through a series of
initiatives. First, as guardian of the treaty your
Commission has a duty to police the existing EU
rules. This means combating infringements to
competition rules and the single market, and
implementing the Stability and Growth Pact to
trigger the necessary budgetary adjustments.
Second, the new Commission will also have to see
through the on-going legislative process
introducing the new framework for EU financial
supervision. Third, your Commission will have to
work closely with our foreign partners to fulfil the
promise of world leaders meeting in L’Aquila in July
to complete the Doha Development Round in 2010,
which remains our best insurance policy against
the risks of protectionist responses to the
economic and social consequences of the crisis.
Your other priority task for the next few months will
be to deliver on the EU’s commitments on climate
change control and to secure similarly ambitious
promises from our foreign partners so as to ensure
the success of the UN Climate Change Conference
to be held in Copenhagen at the end of this year.   
But demanding though these tasks will be, you
cannot afford to confine yourself to planning for the
next few months. The challenges we have described
above clearly suggest that the stakes for Europe in
the next few years will be high and that they call for
a transformational agenda. Lack of ambition for
Europe would in effect not appease, but rather
vindicate, the anti-European forces that have
emerged in recent years, and entail the risk of
jeopardising the European project itself. 
Yet, at the same time, it must be recognised that no
one is contemplating a major institutional initiative,
let alone a new treaty change, so whatever will be
done needs to take place essentially within the
framework of the Lisbon Treaty – assuming it is
ratified by the time the new Commission takes
office. 
The solution to this dilemma lies primarily in
leadership. The duty of your Commission will be to
define the challenges, set out the choices and
propose the common responses Europe needs. At a
time when each and every head of state and
government will be overwhelmed by domestic
problems, you cannot expect them to come up with
ideas and initiatives for the collective good. Their
consensus is unlikely to provide useful guidance.
Boldness will be needed and it is unlikely to come
from them. It will need to come from you and your
Commission colleagues. You should therefore be
ready to fight for ideas and take necessary risks.   
You will have to redefine the EU narrative in a
transformed context. Citizens need to know what is
the raison d’être of the EU, ie what it is about and
what it stands for. The outgoing Commission has
had some success in defining what the EU is about:
with its initiatives on climate, energy and migration
it has been able to recast Europe’s role in an age of
globalisation. On the other hand, it has not been
successful in demonstrating what the EU stands
for: it had to backtrack on the services directive,
proved inconsistent on financial liberalisation and
was unable to define what a renewed European
social agenda might consist of. As the old alliance
of convenience between free marketeers and
federalists has largely run out of steam, a new
compromise needs to be found that allows citizens
of various cultural and political backgrounds to
identify with Europe. Ideas have been proposed,
such as Mario Monti’s call for a new balance
between liberalisation and redistribution. You will
need to find the words that capture the idea you
intend to recommend but, more importantly, you
will need to reach out to member states, the
European Parliament and civil society to build
consensus on and elicit support for your proposals.    
Leadership will also be needed to put in place a
coherent post-crisis economic strategy. No matter
how serious the immediate problems, the
Commission will need to focus its action and that of
national governments on the long-term challenges.
This will imply pressing national governments to
avoid immediate moves that jeopardise common
longer-term goals, but also defining and
implementing measures that will strengthen
growth potential and avoid the stagnation trap thatbruegel memos to the new commission 2009 14
threatens Europe’s future. To this end short-term
responses need to be consistent with long-term
goals. This is not the case at present with, on the
one hand, a series of immediate, short-term
initiatives and, on the other hand, a Lisbon Strategy
which is losing the little traction it once had. 
You should take the initiative and propose to define
and implement for the next five years an economic
revival package consisting of:
• A programme to restore the sustainability of
public finances;
• A blueprint for recovery in the new member
states and for euro-area enlargement;
• A plan for exit from exceptional crisis-
management action;
• A European Growth and Employment
Programme. 
The details of the first two proposals are presented
in the memo to the Commissioner for Economic and
Monetary Affairs, so we focus here on the last two. 
The exit from exceptional crisis-management
measures involves many technical dimensions that
are better dealt with by specialists. But there is one
dimension that you should concentrate on: the
extent to which these policies need to be
coordinated. In banking, the loose character of
coordination has been highlighted by the absence
of a European process of triage involving consistent
balance-sheet assessment and stress-testing,
which puts the single market at risk. You should
emphasise that while member states remain
responsible for providing financial support there is
a need for a common solution to Europe’s banking
problems. Similarly, unless the Commission takes
the initiative in helping to restructure an
automotive sector suffering from overcapacity
(owing not only to new competitors but also to
rising oil prices and concerns about climate
change), national intervention could severely
damage the single market. In both cases
exceptional measures do not require permanent
transfers of sovereignty, but rather an explicitly
temporary common response.  
The crisis risks significantly and permanently
reducing the EU’s potential output. There is also a
serious danger of a reduction in long-run potential
growth rates, as the crisis is likely to result in a
more restrictive financial regime less conducive to
innovation. Together with weakening demographic
conditions and the higher tax rates implied by the
deterioration of public finances, such developments
would turn Europe into a permanently low-growth
area incapable of attracting, or even retaining, the
most productive personnel and companies. 
Countering these dampening forces will require a
new European Growth and Employment Programme
– as such, the successor of the Lisbon Strategy –
whic h c o ul d r e l y o n s o m e o f t h e f e at ur e s o f t h e
Lisbon agenda, in particular the lynchpin role of a
competitive single market for boosting productivity
growth and of well-functioning labour markets and
social conditions for improving employment
performance. In addition, and in contrast to Lisbon,
the new programme would need refocusing and a
stronger EU component in selected fields.
Candidates include: financial markets, which were
neglected in the Lisbon Strategy and remain an
essential catalyst for investment and innovation;
the knowledge triangle, and in particular higher
education, where Europe can build on the success
of the Bologna process and take initiatives in line
with the European Research Area concept
enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty; and green growth,
where the EU needs to make its climate
commitments the basis for a sustainable economic
development strategy. 
In designing the new European Growth and
Employment Programme for the period after 2010,
you will be confronted with one major difficulty. You
will not have any new money to rely on since
government finances are stretched to the extreme.
Luckily, you will have an opportunity to improve the
EU budget: in 2005, the European Council agreed on
the principle of carrying out and in-depth budget
review. This review initially planned for 2008/2009
has been postponed until after the entry into force
of the Lisbon Treaty. You should conduct this review
as soon as you take office and put forward withoutbruegel memos to the new commission 2009 15
delay proposals for an immediate revision of the EU
budget. The new economic situation calls for new
spending priorities. Postponing changes until the
start of the next programming period in 2014 would
be a sign of misplaced inflexibility. Consistent with
the European Growth and Employment Programme
you should therefore propose a revision of the EU
budget effective in 2011. 
Last but not least your economic strategy must
continue building on the efforts of the Barroso
Commission to shape globalisation. The emergence
of new global powers requires a rethink of global
governance to ensure that all the essential players
have a stake in the process and are effectively
engaged in it. This concerns not only traditional
areas and institutions such trade and the WTO or
international finance and the IMF, but also new
areas such as climate change.  The combination of
a global crisis-inspired spirit of cooperation and of a
US administration that is sympathetic to
multilateralism offers a rare opportunity for
progress. To play its role, the EU should first
overcome its ‘fragmented-power’ syndrome and
reform its internal governance in order to speak
more effectively in international economic forums.
A situation in which the EU has a seat at the G20
but is not considered a legitimate voice by its own
members is untenable. There are means to improve
upon the present situation even in the absence of
governance reform. For instance, the participating
EU countries could speak with one voice within the
G20 by delegating to one of them the responsibility
for presenting the European position on a particular
topic. Second, the EU should stop playing rearguard
games and spell out its conditions for accepting a
significant diminutio capitisin international forums.
Although the global agenda should be one of your
priorities during the months and years ahead, it
should not lead you to forget that Europe also has
crucial regional responsibilities. Our
neighbourhood is potentially highly volatile and
requires more focused attention on our part,
especially in view of the destabilising
repercussions of the crisis. Despite some recent
progress, the EU’s neighbourhood policy remains
unfit for purpose. This partly reflects an uncertain
or ambiguous stance towards enlargement, partly
the fact that two important pillars of our interaction
with neighbouring countries – energy security and
migration – remain largely outside the scope of
effective common EU action. These shortcomings
will need to be remedied.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 16
Organisation of the Commission
DESIGNING SUCH A STRATEGYwill require leadership
on your part. Setting it in motion will furthermore
require turning the Commission into a more
effective actor, better equipped to deal with major
evolving challenges. This means becoming more of
a ‘policy Commission’ and less of a ‘process
Commission’. Changing the mix between the two
will necessitate reforms in three areas. 
The first concerns the portfolios and the role of
commissioners. In order to exercise leadership in
key areas, a certain number of new posts should be
created:
• Commissioner for Economic and Financial
Affairs. The previous arrangement whereby
responsibility for economic and financial affairs
was split between two commissioners has been
detrimental to both the Commission and the EU
during the economic and financial crisis. It
weakens the Commission internally, vis-à-vis
finance ministers, and externally, in
international forums. Correcting this situation
should be a priority. 
• Commissioner for Internal Market and Industrial
Affairs. With the merger of economic and
financial affairs, the commissioner in charge of
the internal market will be deprived of one of
his/her main responsibilities. At the same time,
the commissioner in charge of industrial affairs,
or more recently enterprise, has lacked proper
policy tools. It is proposed, therefore, to go back
to the situation that prevailed until the early
1990s and to merge internal market and
industrial affairs. This will be especially
important at a time when industrial restructuring
is again high on the European agenda.  
• Commissioner for Climate Change Policy.
Creating this new post will send a strong signal
that climate-change policy will be a key priority
of the new Commission and of the EU, not only in
Copenhagen this December but also in the years
ahead.
• Commissioner for the Knowledge Economy.
Creating this new post will underscore the fact
that making Europe a knowledge economy
remains a vital priority of the new Commission.
The knowledge commissioner should have
responsibility for the three sides of the
knowledge triangle: higher education, research
and innovation. 
• Commissioner for Enlargement and
Neighbourhood Policy. For its own economic and
political stability, the EU needs to pay much
more attention to its neighbours. Having one
commissioner in charge of enlargement and
neighbourhood policy will be an important step
in seeking to devise coherent policies towards
these countries.      
In addition, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
and the creation of a new Commission Vice-
President for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will
be an opportunity to rethink the organisation of the
entire Commission, and not just in the foreign
policy area. Having one commissioner per member
state is positive for the Commission’s legitimacy,
especially in its legislative role. However with 27
member states, and soon more, it means having too
many commissioners in relation to the actual
responsibilities of the Commission. The time may
have come, therefore, to reflect on the value of
introducing two levels of commissioners, just as
Turning the Commission into a more effective actor means becoming
more of a ‘policy Commission’ and less of a ‘process Commission’.
Changing the mix between the two will necessitate reforms.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 17
most governments have ministers and secretaries
of state. Regardless of whether such an approach is
deemed feasible or desirable, the Commission must
find a way to act as a college that takes the time,
despite its size, to deliberate on important policy
choices. This is a sine qua non for the Commission
to act as a policy- rather than a process-driven
institution and to exercise leadership.    
The second area of reform concerns civil servants.
There is obviously plenty of talent within the
Commission, but it cannot ignore the immense pool
of talent that exists in other institutions within or
outside Europe. Except after an enlargement, the
Commission – contrary to, for instance, the
European Central Bank or the European Investment
Bank – rarely opens its top positions (director-
general, deputy director-general or director) to
persons working elsewhere. The Commission needs
to find a better way to tap the best human
resources possible.  
Thirdly, the Commission needs more and better
evaluation of its regulatory and budgetary
measures. Some progress has been made with the
creation in 2006 of the Impact Assessment Board,
which evaluates the potential economic, social and
environmental impact of new regulations prior to
adoption of proposals by the Commission. There is,
however, no comparable effort to evaluate policies
that are already in place, whether they involve
budgetary expenditure or not. This lack of ex-post
evaluation is a major drawback of EU action which
needs to be corrected. This need is likely to be
reinforced by demands from the European
Parliament, which will have greater budgetary
powers under the Lisbon Treaty, to hold the
Commission to account for EU budgetary
expenditure. An independent European Evaluation
Office should therefore be created.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 18bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 19
To: The Commissioner for Economic and
Monetary Affairs
From: Jürgen von Hagen and Jean Pisani-Ferry
Subject: Priorities for your term of office
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BY THE TIME YOU TAKE OFFICE IN EARLY 2010the EU
economy is likely to be in the early stages of
recovery. But you will inherit:
• A weak economy whose recovery is still
hampered by the state of its banks; 
• The return of mass unemployment, with
unemployment rates above 10 percent of the
labour force and in the 15-20 percent region in
several cases, and no prospect of improvement
in the short term;
• Industrial production shortfalls of a magnitude
not seen since the Great Depression, as output
in several member states is likely to be more
than 10 percent lower than expected before the
crisis. These shortfalls may only be partially
recoverable in the foreseeable future, as
withdrawals from the labour force, cuts in
investment and innovation spending, and the
inability of the financial system to support
profitable firms and allocate capital to the most
productive use may have severely lowered the
production potential;
• A depression-deep crisis in parts of central and
eastern Europe (with output in the Baltic
countries 20 or 30 percent  below the level
expected before the crisis and several countries
in the region, including EU member states, under
IMF programmes);
• A profound deterioration of public finances,
virtually all EU member states officially
considered as having ‘excessive deficits’,
g e n e r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  d e f i c i t s   i n  e x c e s s  o f  1 0
percent of GDP in several countries, and an
increase in the average public debt ratio by 20-
30 percentage points, in some cases much more.
Persistent deficits in some countries are likely to
lead to a serious threat to the sustainability of
public finances.
You will also be confronted with increased
divergences between countries as some suffer
much more from the crisis than others and, as a
consequence, risks of divergent political and policy
developments. In the euro area, some countries
may face problems with financing their public
expenditure and rolling over their public debts as
markets will question the sustainability of public
finances. In any case, there will be tensions
between countries running surpluses and
countries running deficits on their current
accounts, with no consensus on what is the
desirable adjustment process. In the new member
states, acute crises will heighten doubts about the
viability of the growth and convergence models of
some of the former star performers.  
From a political and policy standpoint, the crisis
has undermined public confidence in open and
competitive markets and this will reduce public
support for the single European market and the
structural reforms you certainly intend to push for.
Necessary or at least legitimate government
intervention to rescue private banks and
companies may have degenerated into a pervasive
appetite for state aid and a distrust of competition,
with the result that your colleague in charge of
competition policy, but also the whole Commission,
will be on the defensive. You should be prepared to
face creeping fragmentation of the European
economy as a consequence of growing divergences
among member states, possibly involving conflict
over the desirable direction of economic policy, and
a return of economic nationalism.
In the best possible scenario, the next five years
will be devoted to, and marred by, the process of
adjusting to the shock and by the end of your
mandate you will only be able claim that the major
part of the adjustment has been completed.
You must furthermore be aware that confidence in
the effectiveness of the EU economic policy system
has been severely hurt by the crisis. Thanks to its
immediate response to the liquidity crisis and its
large-scale continuing support to the banking
system, the European Central Bank (ECB) is
emerging strengthened from the crisis. Assuming
that the immediate threat to financial stability is
over and that the large amounts of liquidity injected
into the financial system in recent months can be
mopped up without resulting in increased inflation,
the ECB will have gained both legitimacy and a
reputation for effectiveness. The same cannot be
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In the best possible scenario, the next five years will be devoted to
the process of adjusting to the shock. Confidence in the EU
economic policy system has been severely hurt by the crisis.
said, however, of the other components of the euro-
policy system. By controlling public deficits, the
policy framework was intended prevent crises from
occurring but it has in effect contributed to
distracting attention from instabilities looming in
the private sector. Efforts to make public finances
in the member states more resilient to economic
and financial crises and to build the basis for
common action in times of crisis have also been
insufficient.  
You are going to be in charge of managing
procedures, such as the Stability and Growth Pact,
w h i c h  h a v e  s u f f e r e d  f r o m  c o n s i d e r a b l e  l o s s  o f
credibility. You will shortly be requested to report on
the enlargement of the euro area on the basis of two
criteria, one of which (inflation) will tell you that
virtually all countries are able to join and the other
one (deficits) that virtually all countries are unfit to
join. You will be supposed to rely on, and provide
input to, an institution – the Eurogroup – that was
established to deal with the unexpected but which
has not been able to take any meaningful initiative
when the unexpected occurred. The Commission
itself has lost its shine because it has failed to seize
the initiative at the crucial moment and has not
proven to be an effective crisis manager. So, a key
choice for you and your colleagues is whether to
focus on policy action, at the cost of relying on
impaired policy instruments, or to propose policy
reforms, at the cost of being distracted from action
at a time when it will be urgent.
There is finally a field where you may have to take
the initiative for institutional rather than purely
economic reasons. Global economic governance is
changing fast as a consequence of the recognition
that (a) the crisis calls for global solutions and (b)
the time has come to give voice and power to the
largest emerging and developing economies. No
one knows whether the G20 will become an
effective institution for global economic
management or be a mere forum for dialogue. But
significant reforms are possible, because the
current US administration is more sympathetic to
multilateralism than the preceding one. This raises
the question of Europe’s ability to define and play
its role at the global level, and therefore of the voice
and representation of the EU and the member
states. The rest of the world is increasingly irritated
by Europe’s permanent squabbling over chairs in
international forums and the Commission
advocating consolidation.  The reality is that in
recent years Europe has not moved towards this,
but rather away from it. Now that the role of the G20
has been expanded, the larger EU member states
are less keen than ever to concede power and voice
and it is true that, throughout the crisis, the EU as
a n  e n t i t y  h a s  n o t  b e e n  a b l e  t o  e n g a g e  i n  a
meaningful way in international economic and
financial discussions. Together with the president,
it will be your role to take initiatives and make
proposals for reforms in this area, and this will be
facilitated by the entry into force of the Lisbon
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A strategy
AGAINST THIS BACKGROUNDyou cannot afford to be
merely a servant of outdated procedures, and you
cannot afford either to be the advocate of
institutional reforms at a time when everyone’s
attention is (rightly) focused on results. What you
can do, however, is to make use of a situation that
calls for close consultation and coordination to
redefine the role of the Commission and regain
authority. To this end, you should devise and
propose a strategy centred on economic priorities
for the EU and make sure that it can be carried out
within the existing institutional framework, while
creating opportunities for later changes in
governance.   
The six pillars of the strategy should be: 
a)An exit plan
When the crisis hit, exceptional measures were
taken to prevent a collapse of the financial system,
avoid a generalised credit crunch, limit the depth of
the recession, avert bankruptcy contagion, and
contain damage to labour markets. Most of these
necessary measures took policymakers into the
very territory they were previously cautious not to
venture into: massive expansion of central bank
liquidity, extraordinary deficits and pervasive state
aid, to name only the main measures. As the
situation stabilises and the contours of the
recovery emerge, the question will increasingly be
about when and how policy can exit the crisis-
management mode and return to normality. 
Eagerness to exit from exceptional crisis
management is natural – and welcome. The sooner
a normal policy framework can be restored, the
better. But a generalised rush to exit combining the
mopping up of liquidity, interest rate increases,
vigorous budgetary adjustment and the withdrawal
of government guarantees would be a recipe for a
double-dip recession. Exit is bound to be gradual
and because crisis management policies are
interdependent, a proper sequencing of
normalisation action by governments, the
Commission and central banks is essential for
success. Coordination across countries will also
matter, especially about governments’ withdrawal
o f  e x c e p t i o n a l  b a n k  s u p p o r t ,  b u t  a l s o  o n  t h e
budgetary side. Your first priorities should therefore
be to establish a temporary consultation
mechanism so that exit decisions are coordinated
among the various players, and to propose an exit
plan that allows a return to the normal state of
affairs while providing the necessary conditions for
a strengthening of the recovery. This coordination
e f f o r t  d o e s  n o t  n e e d  t o  r e s u l t  i n  p e r m a n e n t
arrangements. In fact, it is likely to be better
accepted if explicitly provisional.
b)A European growth programme for the next five
years
Beyond the immediate measures, Europe needs
longer-term initiatives to reignite growth and
employment. These must involve EU action in fields
such as capital markets and climate change,
national initiatives in areas where member states
have the leading role, such as in certain product
markets and certainly labour markets, and joint
initiatives in fields like higher education, research,
and innovation. You are not in direct control of any
of these instruments so we will not describe the
necessary action in detail here (they are presented
in the memo to the President). But we wish to insist
on one point: you cannot abandon the design of the
growth strategy to your colleagues in charge of
specific instruments or sectors or to the
necessarily political supervision of the president.
The responsibility of the Commissioner for
Economic and Monetary Affairs is not only to
manage the specific instruments he or she is in
charge of – such as the Stability and Growth Pact –
but, equally importantly, to be the relentless
a d v o c a t e  o f  e c o n o m i c  e f f i c i e n c y  a n d  c o h e r e n c e
within the Commission. Your role will be to devise
and propose the economic underpinnings of a new
programme for 2010-2015, linking the immediate
crisis management measures with the longer-term
priorities. This is an essential role: the situation is
too serious for Europe to succumb again to the
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c) A European sustainability programme for the
next five years
Virtually all EU member states need to design and
start implementing budgetary adjustment
programmes to trim and eventually eliminate their
deficits, with a view to stabilising and later reducing
their public-debt ratios. Given the magnitude of the
deficits and the need to avoid withdrawing the
stimulus prematurely, a five-year horizon is
appropriate for programming the adjustment.
Within this timeframe budgetary adjustment needs
to involve (in variable proportions depending on the
country) expenditure cuts, tax increases and
pension reforms that improve the long-term
sustainability of public finances. In several
countries institutional reforms are also needed in
order to enhance the credibility of commitments to
budgetary discipline.
To trigger this process, the procedures of the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) will be of limited
help. They were designed to single out and punish
individual sinners, not the entire EU. And they are of
questionable value, as a narrow focus on deficits
blinded your predecessor to vulnerabilities in
countries whose fiscal performance relied on the
financial health of shaky banks. You cannot afford
to start by opening the Pandora’s box of SGP reform,
so you will have to tinker with this damaged
instrument. But you will have a new ally: market
discipline. In the crisis markets have differentiated
much more forcefully between sovereign debtors of
different perceived quality than before and, even if
spreads have narrowed, the memory of this episode
remains. Furthermore, rating agencies have started
to downgrade several states. So while EU sanctions
remain an elusive threat, funding crises have
become a real one. This increases the value of EU
‘labelling’ of national budgets and can be a powerful
incentive for governments, provided you play the
game skilfully. Clearly, for you to put market
discipline on your side, you will need to avoid
making open-ended commitments of unconditional
financial support to all euro-area countries.   
What you have to do is first to build consensus on
the desirable pace of the budgetary adjustment.
Together with the president, you should propose a
European Sustainability Programme for adoption by
the European Council, as a companion the
European Growth Programme.
The European Sustainability Programme should
make use of the provisions of the SGP which
provide a margin for a more sensible approach to
budgetary discipline:
• First, it should define country-by-country deficit
objectives for 2015 that take into account both
the level of public debt and implicit liabilities,
including those arising from unfunded pension
liabilities. If countries reduce their implicit
liabilities, for example through pension reforms,
this should be taken into account in a revision of
the budget-deficit objective. 
• Second, it should include a commitment by each
member government to present to its parliament
by September 2010 a medium-term budgetary
programme that sets out the measures
proposed in order to achieve the budgetary
objective. 
• Third, it should call on member states to reform
their policy institutions and rules, with a view to
enhancing budgetary credibility and creating the
conditions for a decentralisation of fiscal
discipline. Incentives for decentralised discipline
should be adopted so that countries with more
credible institutions or effective rules, and a
stronger record, are given more flexibility in the
short run. 
d)A framework for coordination within the euro
area
One of the main lessons from the crisis is that the
old mechanisms for coordination among the
finance ministers, especially of the Eurogroup, have
not worked well. This concerns both the reaction to
the financial crisis when it became visible on the
horizon during the autumn of 2007 and the spring
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2008, and the reaction to the severe economic
downturn that followed. In the past, crises have
regularly been opportunities for European
integration to develop in new directions and to
improve the EU’s institutional structure. An
important challenge for you and the Commission
more generally will be to muster sufficient
leadership to seize this opportunity to strengthen
the EU’s governance. 
During the first ten years of the euro, divergences
within monetary union were left unattended as long
as they did not originate in divergent budgetary
positions. This was not because of a lack of
mandate or instruments – after all the EU adopts
annual country-specific Economic Policy Guidelines
and can if needed issue recommendations – but
the assumption was too often that instability can
only result from fiscal irresponsibility. Yet the two
euro-area countries where a bubble burst and
domestic demand collapsed in 2008-2009 were
both paragons of fiscal rectitude. This is a clear
indication that the existing framework for
surveillance and coordination is inadequate (as in
fact recognised early on in the Euro@10 report
presented by your predecessor in spring 2008). 
Looking forward, you need to propose to the
Eurogroup new benchmarks for the surveillance of
national policies. Here you cannot rely on the
existing framework, which barely exists, but must
think afresh. The most promising avenue is to
select a set of indicators (including the external
balance and relative competitiveness) and to use
them as a systematic basis for macroeconomic
surveillance. You should state your intention fully
to play your role, which implies preparing country-
specific surveillance reports whenever you
perceive a risk to macroeconomic sustainability
and making proposals for the use of country-by-
country recommendations under Article 99 of the
treaty. However you should be aware that this will
imply having a view on the situation of surplus as
well as deficit countries. Even-handedness is
essential to the credibility of macroeconomic
surveillance.    
However, even the best surveillance framework will
not banish crises. We now know how damaging
they can be and we have even learnt that crises
within the euro area are possible. As already
observed, a funding crisis affecting a member state
of the euro area has to be regarded as a possibility
and the EU must draw up contingency plans for
such situations. Yet a lesson from recent months is
that the EU is not equipped with crisis-management
capabilities. 
You should therefore prepare a proposal on how to
coordinate crisis response at EU level. This need not
imply additional treaty instruments but a political
agreement on how the existing tools, such as Article
100 of the treaty, should be used when an urgent
response is called for.
e)A blueprint for recovery in the new member
states and euro-area enlargement
Several of the new member states have been hit
very hard by the crisis and you should be prepared
for the unexpected. It is to be hoped – but it is by no
means certain – that the intensity of the crisis will
have abated somewhat and instead of managing
further crises you will be able to concentrate on
supporting the recovery. But even on this
optimistic assumption your task will not be an easy
one. There is a clear risk that the successful growth
model that allowed rapid catching-up in the region
will not survive the crisis and that some of the new
member states will experience relative stagnation.
You should therefore assess the obstacles to
growth and propose a blueprint for recovery in the
new member states. 
An issue of major importance in this respect is euro
membership. The euro area members, the ECB and
the Commission have argued so far that euro entry
should be decided country-by-country on the basis
of the criteria set out in the early 1990s for the
formation of monetary union in 1999. But this
makes less and less sense. First, the country-by-
country approach ignores regional spillovers. As
Slovakia has experienced, a country’s fate in the
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monetary strategy of its competitors. Second, the
criteria made little sense in normal times but they
have now become wholly inappropriate. When two
criteria designed to be mutually consistent –
inflation and deficits – convey opposing messages,
it is likely to be because there is a problem with the
criteria. 
So your economic brief is clear: you should break
with the formalistic approach and make an
economic assessment of the costs and benefits of
euro membership on the basis of both the
immediate benefits of joining and the longer-term
sustainability issues, and taking into account the
regional dimension. You should assess at what
exchange-rate level potential members should join
and what should be the preconditions, including in
some cases as regards the restructuring of private
hard-currency debts. This assessment should be
discussed with candidates and euro-area members
and serve as a basis for a renewed euro-area
enlargement strategy. To countries wishing to join
the euro, a path to membership should be offered,
with clear, economically meaningful benchmarks
instead of a-temporal, nowadays largely irrelevant
criteria. Countries preferring to postpone euro entry
should be free to do so. Looking beyond the EU
borders, monetary cooperation should be offered to
neighbouring countries.
To restore some economic logic to a process where
a legalistic approach has been allowed to dominate
(in large part because it offered a convenient
excuse for procrastination) will not be easy. But
you should remind everyone that the criteria for
joining the euro were introduced in order to ensure
that economic logic prevails over political logic, not
that legal logic prevails over economic logic.    
f) A path towards common external
representation 
For decades now the Commission has, rightly,
argued that the EU is a much more effective player
in the trade field, where it speaks with the one voice
of the commissioner for trade, than in the
macroeconomic or the financial fields, where it
speaks with several voices. For decades it has
insisted that trade policy therefore provides a
template for the management of external economic
relations and that it should be replicated in other
fields. But it has not had any significant success in
bringing this about. 
The reasons for this state of affairs are many. One is
that topics discussed at the G20 or at the IMF board
meetings only partially belong to the EU’s remit.
Another is that IMF constituencies include EU as
well as non-EU countries, so there cannot be an EU
voice as there are no EU seats. A third reason is that
the Commission’s contribution to international
affairs has never been exceptional. But by far the
most important reason is that the larger member
states are willing to use any pretext to hang on the
power they have. The creation of the G20 has made
t h e m  l e s s  k e e n  t h a n  e v e r  o n  c h a n g e s  i n  t h e i r
external representation. Why, after all, should large
European countries refrain from speaking with their
own voice when Argentina and Australia have a seat
at the G20? 
If you do not engage battle on this point, you may
soon observe that individual representation of
major member states in global discussions may
l e a d  t h e m  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  b y p a s s  t h e  E U  l e v e l  –
thereby undermining the single market and intra-
EU coordination. The consequences for the EU could
You should remind everyone that the criteria for joining the euro
were introduced in order to ensure that economic logic prevails over
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be severe and they would probably not be limited to
the macro-financial field. Eventually, even
integrated areas such as external trade could be
affected. But revolution is unlikely and you must
define a realistic path. 
One way out could be to start by restructuring IMF
constituencies in a way that ensures there is a
subset of euro-area constituencies and a subset of
non-euro EU constituencies. This would at least
facilitate coordination and adoption of common
positions, facilitating the task of the Commission
and paving the way for future ‘folding in’ of
representation into two constituencies. 
Another initiative you should take is to outline a
regional economic strategy for the euro area. The
euro is not a rival to the US dollar but it is a very
successful regional currency, and a clear and
necessary step towards a global role is for the euro
to start by playing a meaningful regional role. 
Crises are times for institutional reform and
improvement. Most major steps forward in EU
integration have come in response to political and
economic crisis – for example the euro emerged
from the inflationary traumas of the 1970s and the
1980s. When your predecessors called for
coordination of national policies, their message
often fell on deaf ears. To be sure, national
policymakers are currently driven by political
constraints and imperatives, but they also realise
that boosting policy coordination is indispensable
in the face of doubts about the viability of the euro.
Now is the time to exert leadership and improve the
framework for Economic and Monetary Union.
Crises are times for institutional reform. To be sure, national policy-
makers are currently driven by political constraints and imperatives,
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To: The Commissioner for Financial Services
From: Nicolas Véron
Subject: Priorities for your term of office
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FINANCIAL SERVICES IS ONE OF THOSE AREAS for
which the European Union can be both proud of its
past achievements and humbled by the magnitude
of its task. This would be the case even if the crisis
had not erupted, but the current environment
means that your portfolio has become one of the
most exposed of the entire Commission. You are
likely to be remembered either for major shortcomings
and failures, or for major breakthroughs.
Over the past ten years, the Commission’s efforts in
your area of responsibility have been focused on
one dominant goal: financial integration. The aim
has been to forcefully eliminate barriers to the
emergence of a single financial market. This effort
has mainly centred on three major policies, the first
two of which have been pioneered by other parts of
the Commission: Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU); competition policy, which has considerably
reduced the scope for national banking
protectionism under the cover of prudential
supervision, starting with the landmark case of
Champalimaud in Portugal (1999); and the
Financial Services Action Plan, an ambitious
legislative programme adopted in May 1999 and
mostly implemented during the following
Commission term (1999-2004). These three
policies have been conducted simultaneously with
two major related developments, namely the
introduction of the so-called Lamfalussy process
for financial regulation and the adoption of
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
There were good reasons to devote so much energy
to financial integration. By enabling better
allocation of capital, it enhances Europe’s growth
potential. Furthermore, it contributes to the
sustainability of EMU as it is a powerful driver of
economic convergence; conversely, a monetary
union with fragmented capital markets is likely to
be subject to significant internal economic
disparities which may threaten its very existence.
An additional benefit, which was perhaps not
explicitly sought, is that a financially integrated EU
is a much heftier player on global financial markets
than the sum of fragmented national systems could
be, thus enhancing the EU’s influence in
international regulatory choices. A remarkable
illustration of this was the extent to which other
nations adopted IFRS once the EU had endorsed
them. 
Although economic impact is fiendishly difficult to
measure, financial integration has indeed
remodelled Europe’s financial landscape in
powerful ways. It has reinforced London as a major
international financial hub, as many wholesale
activities of continental financial firms have tended
to migrate there: thanks to this the EU has the (by
several measures) leading global financial centre
on its territory. It has contributed to the strong
catch-up growth of central and eastern European
countries, which was largely fuelled by credit
channelled through local subsidiaries of banking
groups headquartered in the ‘older’ member states.
It has generally fostered better financial services
throughout the EU by raising the competitive
pressure on incumbents, even though this effect
has been unevenly spread as situations vary
widely from one member state to another. 
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IN SPITE OF PAST SUCCESSES, the challenges would
have been daunting even if there had been no
crisis; with the crisis, they are colossal. The current
risks include major cross-border banking failures
which could spiral out of control for lack of an
appropriate crisis-management framework and
may threaten the very fabric of the EU; an
unravelling of global and intra-EU financial
integration; and ill thought-out regulatory moves
(or absence of necessary regulatory action) that
would hamper Europe’s growth potential. It would
be foolish and utterly irresponsible to count on luck
to prevent these risks from materialising, with all
the catastrophic consequences they would have. 
The core challenge is that your predecessors have
made great and hard-to-reverse steps towards a
single EU financial system but have failed to create
the public institutions that would make such a
system sustainable. During the decade to 2007,
whether driven by ideology or captured by special
interests or both, many observers and
policymakers have complacently adhered to the
view that the financial system would essentially
take care of itself, and that the design and
effectiveness of regulation and supervision were
somewhat second-order issues. The crisis
illustrates how misguided this view – in some
cases inspired by free-market fundamentalist
ideology – has been. The difficulty is that you
cannot simultaneously have financial integration,
full national financial policy sovereignty and
effective supervision. Now, the third of these three
dimensions can no longer be neglected, and as a
consequence the EU finds itself in a trap from which
there are only two possible exits: either market
fragmentation, which would make everyone poorer;
or institutional build-up, which is the far better
option from an economic standpoint, even if
fraught with technical and political pitfalls. 
Conversely, you should be aware of the obverse risk
of excessive or poorly conceived regulation, which
would place a drag on Europe’s competitiveness
and reduce our growth potential. Well before the
crisis, Europe had suffered from obstacles to the
development of those financial services that are
most needed by high-growth firms which rely
extensively on external funding, such as growth
equity investment, subordinated and mezzanine
debt and high-yield bonds. As a result, Europe (like
Japan) has demonstrated minimal ability in the
past few decades to nurture ‘new champions’,
companies that grow from nothing to global leaders
while creating a large number of jobs in the process
– which, by contrast, are numerous in both the
United States and emerging economies. Ill thought-
through reactions to the crisis risk reinforcing such
obstacles. Reducing them involves more
competition in some financial services segments;
better tailored tax, securities and prudential
regulation; and reform and partial harmonisation of
antiquated insolvency legislation. Good financial
regulation is a delicate line to tread, and you will
need a fine combination of market savvy and
assertiveness on behalf of the public interest. 
You will have to act simultaneously on a short- and
a long-term agenda. On the short-term side, you are
confronted with the sorry situation of Europe’s
banking sector, in which the need for
comprehensive recapitalisation and restructuring
has so far largely been met by policy paralysis.
Beyond the immediate sticking-plaster solutions
applied by member states since October 2008, a
centralised system-wide approach is necessary to
fix this banking crisis, and ‘system-wide’ here
means EU-wide, or at least on a scale covering the
main continental European countries (as the
British and Scandinavian banking systems can
arguably be considered autonomous with regard to
the rest of the EU). In spite of all the criticism they
have given rise to, the US ‘stress tests’, whose
results were published in May 2009, have
tentatively addressed this challenge. Continental
Europe has done nothing equivalent. Europe-wide
bank triage is necessary to provide transparency
and trigger the indispensable restructuring of those
multinational financial groups which may not
survive on a stand-alone basis. 
Furthermore, depending on the severity of the
crisis-related future developments, the credit
needs of Europe’s companies and households may
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not adequately be met in the short term by
commercially run financial intermediaries, which
could in some scenarios lead to a significant
(though, it is to be hoped, temporary) build-up of
public-sector credit providers to the economy. In
such a case, innovative solutions will be needed
from the EU institutions to prevent massive
distortions in the European economy. 
On a longer-term basis, you will need to work on all
four dimensions of a sound EU financial services
policy: 
• Financial stability has understandably become
the priority concern. Here the needs are effective
supervision, protection of retail deposits and a
capacity to manage future crises and let failed
firms exit the marketplace in any orderly way. In
an integrated financial system, these cannot be
properly addressed with the current institutional
fragmentation. 
• Financial efficiency should be improved to
enhance Europe’s growth potential. It requires
significant progress in the EU financial system’s
ability to provide external capital, which could be
channelled from Europeans’ ample savings to
those actors who need it most, including fast-
growth companies. 
• Financial fairness should be pursued through
adequate protection of the weaker players in the
system, which depending on the issues may
include consumers, investors and actual or
potential competitors to powerful established
players. The Commission has a number of
instruments at its disposal to act in this area and
you should advocate their robust use to meet
the challenges created or reinforced by the
crisis. 
• Finally,  financial integration must not be
abandoned but, on the contrary, defended and
promoted. It requires not only harmonisation of
rules and regulations, but also consistent
compliance and implementation, which is
impossible without effective enforcement
mechanisms. Better mechanisms are needed to
meet this challenge.
You will have to deal with short-term crisis management.
Simultaneously, you will face the indispensable reform of the EU
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Recommendations
TO MEET THESE MONUMENTAL CHALLENGES, you
will need considerable doggedness and focus, and
a stronger sense of direction and priorities than has
been displayed in recent years as regards your
portfolio. As the crisis creates more pressure for
politicised, knee-jerk decisions, clarity of purpose is
necessary not only to guide your own initiatives
but also to be able to prevent ill-advised policy
moves at a time when the desire to find and punish
culprits can be high in the public consciousness. 
Simultaneously, you should not sacrifice but rather
reinforce the quality of the policy process. Though it
has occasionally been used by some players to
delay necessary policies, better regulation is a
sound objective and should be defended against
the temptation to skip thoughtful design, impact
analysis and consultation of stakeholders in the
name of expediency. 
You will have to deal with short-term crisis
management, which is de facto a shared
responsibility between the national and EU level,
and regulatory reform, which is mainly an EU-level
responsibility but must be closely coordinated with
other jurisdictions such as the US and international
groupings such as the G20 and Financial Stability
Board. Simultaneously, you will face a specifically
European task, namely the indispensable reform of
the EU financial regulatory and supervisory
architecture. It will not be easy, even though the
conclusions of the EU summit of 18-19 June
provide a basis for progress. 
To succeed in a demanding environment, you will
need to go back to basics. First, you should publish,
say in the first half of 2010, a clear vision for the
financial system Europe needs – how stable, how
efficient, how fair and how integrated it should be,
reflecting the four dimensions described in the
previous section. You should work hard to build a
consensus for this vision among member states
and the public. This will be a crucial step to allow
you subsequently to set out the means to achieve
the desired ends. Clarity of vision will help you not
to be overwhelmed by turf fights and special-
interest considerations, which weigh particularly
heavily in this policy area. You may not want to take
a stance on all aspects early on, in the same way
that the US president’s plan for financial reform
announced on 17 June leaves many key aspects
open to further elaboration. But you need to
articulate the key parameters that will then drive
decisions on specific issues. Do not confuse haste
with speed. As in high-end manufacturing,
mistakes are better corrected or averted during the
early design phase; otherwise, they will result in
much longer delays and costs, or ruin the project
altogether. Move swiftly, but make sure your vision
is comprehensive and shared by a critical mass of
constituents. 
Then, basing yourself both on this vision and on the
principles at the core of the European Union, you
should devote the next six months to a
comprehensive Subsidiarity review, to be carried
out by the Commission’s services under your
leadership. 
In this review, you should examine the key financial
services policy areas, including financial stability
and prudential oversight, protection of investors
and consumers, market integrity, and financial
disclosure. The review should be based not just on
the usual routine of publishing drafts and collecting
spontaneous feedback, which engages only the
most dedicated special-interest groups, but on
active consultation of those stakeholders whose
welfare and input you care most about.
This process should determine which tasks the EU
should give back to member states, which ones it
should take over from them, and which new bodies
– not new layers of committees, but decision-
making authorities – may be required credibly to
carry them out. This will be the basis for the
requisite overhaul of EU supervisory and regulatory
architecture. Separating this exercise from the prior
establishment of your vision for Europe’s financial
system will help you to focus the debate on
substance and not be deflected by vested interests
or defence of the status quo. The question will not
be whether your approach is ‘evolutionary’ or
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requirements of a sustainable EU financial system,
or not. 
In parallel, you will be confronted with the difficult
questions of crisis management and of the very
purpose and key tenets of financial regulation,
such as the nature and instruments of macro-
prudential policies, the role and definition of capital
requirements, the compatibility of different
financial-service segments in the same financial
group and the extent of risk disclosures by
financial-market participants. On these
fundamental issues you should seek synergies
with the US policy-elaboration process, which is
generally faster and more in-depth than the
European equivalents, in liaison with your
correspondents in member states’ national
authorities, especially those which participate in
G20 meetings or key bodies hosted by the Bank for
International Settlements. 
Your tasks will inter alia entail a hefty legislative
programme. Aspects of it will be unprecedented at
EU level, such as on company law with the
introduction of a consistent insolvency regime for
systemically important financial-services firms.
Partnership with the newly elected European
Parliament should be, more perhaps than for any of
your predecessors, a core tenet of your ambitions.  bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 35bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 36bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 37
To: The Commissioner for Competition Policy
From: Lars-Hendrik Röller
Subject: Priorities for your term of office
Date: 1 September 2009bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 38
EUROPEAN UNION COMPETITION POLICYis one of the
success stories of Europe.  The main reason for this
success is the fact that member states have
delegated substantial powers in the fields of merger
control, antitrust and state aid to the European
Commission. As a result, competition policy has
developed into a powerful instrument for enforcing
a set of consistent rules across Europe. The impact
and significance of EU competition policy can be
divided into two areas. The first is the internal
dimension: providing a consistent set of rules
through a one-stop shop, coherent implementation
of competition law, as well as by spreading the
competition culture across Europe, including to the
new member states. The second - and increasingly
important over the last few years – is the external
dimension: Europe speaks with one voice on
competition matters to third countries, such as the
US and China. Indeed Europe has had a significant
impact on the new competition policy regime in
China. 
In the last few years, Europe has undertaken a
substantial number of initiatives and reforms.  Key
policy reforms have been adopted in the area of
merger control, where a new test for deciding on
anticompetitive mergers was introduced in 2004.
In addition, the role of ‘efficiencies’ in merger
control has been clarified and encouraged.  Cartel
enforcement has been one of the priorities of your
predecessors.  Record fines have been imposed, not
only in cartel cases but also in cases of abuse of
dominant position such as Microsoft and Intel. As a
result of these enforcement activities, many
European companies have launched
comprehensive – as well as expensive –
compliance programmes in order to prevent future
fines. Finally, the area of state aid control has
undergone reform as well. The state aid action plan
introduced the so-called ‘balancing test’, by which
the positive (rectifying market failure) and
negative effects (distortions of competition) of
state aid measures are weighed against each other.  
All these developments in EU competition policy are
generally very positive. As a result, Europe has been
at the forefront of competition policy, and some
even refer to it as the world’s leading jurisdiction in
antitrust matters.  However, there are major policy
challenges ahead that need to be addressed in
order to keep the success story going.
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THE FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT CHALLENGE is to
keep the rules of competition policy intact in times
of economic crisis. There are no grounds for
compromise on competition policy principles, as
the current rules are well equipped to deal with the
financial and economic crisis. One of your main
challenges is thus to avoid ‘throwing the baby out
with the bathwater’ and to keep markets fair and
open.  
This applies in particular to the area of state aid.
The financial and economic crisis has increased the
political demand for state aid, not only in banking
and finance but also increasingly in all sectors of
the economy.  State aid has always been an area of
competition policy where political pressures are
significantly higher than elsewhere. And such
pressures are intensifying as the crisis percolates
through to the real economy and the labour market.
Competition policy therefore needs to be firmly
enforced – in particular in the area of state aid – so
that markets continue to be open and transparent.
This is a first key challenge for you and for the new
College as a whole.
Moreover, the area of state aid constitutes an
opportunity for you and the new Commission: to be
assertive and show that Europe has an important
role to play in boosting the future economic
strength of our industrial base. This is crucial for
future economic performance, including for our
welfare states. Getting the right industrial policy for
Europe is key, getting it wrong will guarantee
Europe’s industrial decline for years to come. We
should not sacrifice the long-term growth prospects
of all member states for short-run national interests.
We need a strong Commission in the area of state
aid, and in the area of industrial policy in general.
One of the more significant trends in EU
competition policy has been the increased use of
economics. Under the so-called ‘more economic
approach’ , a more effects-based analysis has been
emphasised, that is, cases are analyzed and
decisions taken in light of their effects on markets
and, in particular, on consumers. Your second
policy challenge is to move this process forward
and focus on markets and consumer benefit – the
so-called ‘consumer surplus standard’ – in order to
preserve competition and not competitors. This is
especially important in times of economic crisis. 
A  third challenge concerns merger control. The
purpose of mergers is to create efficiencies. Despite
this, efficiencies have not played a major role in EU
merger evaluation to date. This is disappointing if
one believes that there are mergers which bring
significant efficiencies, while others produce
virtually no efficiencies at all.  Moreover the current
approach emphasises static efficiencies, not
dynamic efficiencies, such as innovation and fixed
costs savings. Given the economic importance of
dynamic efficiencies, it may be time to be more
explicit about what kind of dynamic efficiencies is
acceptable. 
A fourth challenge relates to how the Commission
approaches ‘market definition’. Although market
definition is primarily used as a screening device, it
is nevertheless a very important aspect of the
practice of competition policy. Market definition in
antitrust and merger control currently emphasises
demand-side substitutability. This contrasts with
the business view of markets, which puts more
emphasis on the supply side (ie. on competitors).
Since many industries are characterised by
increasing international competition on the supply
side, while the demand side remains national or
regional (for example retail electricity markets),
this leads to some frustration between market
definition in antitrust cases as compared to market
definition by the business world.  By not taking
supply-side factors fully into account at the market-
definition stage, the current approach leads to an
overly restrictive market definition, and thus to a
screening bias.  It follows that either market
definition should be de-emphasised as a screening
device*, or that supply-side factors should be
Challenges
* The two new chief economists at the FTC and DOJ, Carl Shapiro and Jo Farell have recently suggested complementary screens
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emphasised more in defining relevant antitrust
markets. 
A fifthchallenge is to address the interface between
competition policy and direct regulatory
intervention in protecting consumers. Horizontal
antitrust laws are often complemented by sector-
specific (often national) regulation. Numerous
other regulations – consumer protection and
safety, environment, high prices – can also be
addressed by competition policy instruments.
Even though many of the regulatory policy
measures have different first-level objectives,
sometimes they even have the same (or a very
similar) objective, such as consumer protection
rules and competition policy, which both address
consumer benefit. In either case more policy
coordination is urgently needed.
A sixthand final policy challenge is to work towards
effective global governance in competition.  More of
the emerging economic powers (such as China and
India) need to be fully integrated into a global
competition architecture. Providing an
international forum and expanding bilateral
relationships creates a much-needed governance
structure in a world where competition-related
issues are increasingly raised at the international
level. It is important to maintain a level playing field
globally.  With the change-over in the White House,
new US antitrust leadership is beginning to take
charge.  An early indication of this is that US
agencies will take a tougher stance in areas such as
mergers and monopolisation. Developing and
strengthening the key relationship between the EU
and the US should be one of your priorities.
You must enforce state aid rules in times of economic crisis. The
state aid system is one of the major accomplishments of European
integration and will ensure that we will achieve growth in the future.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 41
Recommendations
1. Enforce state aid rules in times of economic
crisis
The first and most important challenge. Keep the
state aid system intact. This is one of the major
accomplishments of European integration and
will ensure that we will achieve growth in the
future. 
2. Keep a consumer orientation in competition
policy
Consumer orientation focuses analysis on the
market and not on competitors. Much needed
investment, efficiencies and innovation should
be taken into account and encouraged insofar as
they benefit consumers. 
3. Strengthen the role of efficiencies in merger
control
Increase the role of efficiencies when approving
or blocking mergers and clarify which dynamic
efficiencies are acceptable. 
4. Strengthen supply-side factors in defining
relevant antitrust markets
Take proper account of the internationalisation
of competition when defining markets. Put more
emphasis on supply-side factors in defining
relevant antitrust markets or downgrade market
definition as an antitrust screening device.  
5. Protect consumers through effective
competition, rather than by direct regulatory
intervention
Increase coordination of competition policy
measures with those in other policy areas.
6. Broaden and deepen global ties with
competition regulators
Promote ties with emerging countries with a
view to strengthening competition codes and
deepen cooperation with the competition
authorities of developed countries, especially
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To: The Commissioner for the Single Market
From: Carlo Altomonte
Subject: Priorities for your term of office
Date: 1 September 2009bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 44
State of affairs
AS COMMISSIONER FOR THE SINGLE MARKET, you
will be in charge of one of the key pillars of the
process of EU integration, together with the single
currency. A competitive and truly integrated single
market is also our best asset in promoting
European productivity and growth in an
environment characterised by changing global
trends and technological advance. 
Politically, the EU single market was completed at
the end of 1992, with the aim of eliminating the
remaining barriers to free circulation among
member countries. However, the process has to be
considered as a dynamic one: technological,
political and economic developments imply the
creation of new potential barriers, and thus the
need for constant adaptation of the EU legislative
framework in order to guarantee within the member
states the four so-called ‘fundamental freedoms’
(free movement of goods, services, capital and
people), all core objectives of the EU Treaty.
Given a market of 500 million people, 27 countries,
a GDP of about €13,000 billion and a clear treaty-
defined mission, it is hardly surprising that your
portfolio is among the most sought-after by
incoming commissioners. The EU market, if
properly policed through the crisis, has the
potential to be the springboard for healthy EU-
based businesses to overcome the immediate
shock of the crisis, and sustain the long-run growth
of the EU economy. By the same token, a friction-
free single market can only become more attractive
for non-EU firms to sell into, and is already causing
foreign manufacturing companies to follow
European production standards even on non-EU
markets. As ‘the world’s regulator’, as one
commentator recently put it, you are thus not going
to be focused exclusively on the single market per
se. Your job has indeed a major and growing global
dimension. 
What is more, the Commission has managed to
retain its exclusive right of legislative initiative
under the Lisbon Treaty, which is arguably the
sharpest political weapon in the Commission’s
armoury. In your portfolio in particular, with a
relatively large amount of legislative activity, your
right to propose – or not the propose – new rules
gives you a certain amount of leverage with
member states, along with the power to pursue
governments through the infringement procedure.
But the crisis, and its effect on political sentiment
in member states, has the potential to bring
uncertainty and even chaos to the single market if
not handled skilfully. The crisis is undermining
trust in competitive markets in general, and
throttling support for the single market in
particular. While it is unquestionably right that the
Commission should fully exploit single-market and
competition rules in order to help vital parts of our
economies to cushion the shock of the crisis, we
have already seen behaviour by individual EU
governments, mirroring the actions of other
governments globally, keen to defend shorter-term
domestic sectional interests by locking up value
chains at home at the expense of other member
states. Such behaviour, while politically
understandable in the short term, is economically
inefficient in the long term, if not potentially
disruptive for the single market.
Moreover, crisis or no crisis, there are currently well
over 1000 single-market infringement cases
outstanding against member states, either because
You inherit a policy under serious threat of unravelling; you also inherit
a portfolio in which the Commission’s status has subtly shifted from
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governments have failed to implement agreed rules
correctly, or failed to implement them at all.       
Not only do you inherit a policy under serious threat
of unravelling, you also inherit a portfolio in which
the Commission’s status has subtly shifted from
being a big fish in a little pool to being a somewhat
smaller fish in a big pool. While the Commission has
historically been the undisputed master of
harmonising negotiations in narrowly defined
technical areas, the EU – and therefore the
Commission –   now penetrates ever deeper into
large swathes of the goods and services markets of
member states (think of the across-the-board
services directive, discussed below, the current
debate over financial services, dealt with in another
memo, or the already implemented regulation of
company law and network industries). The less
well-known but equally important case-law of the
European Court of Justice relating to the single
market via infringement or competition procedures
contributes and adds to the picture. These areas are
very high-stake games for national economies
which, as a result, can put you on the back foot with
member states, unless you manage to capture and
exploit the intellectual and political high ground in
this complex arena, and are seen to do this early in
your tenure.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 46
Challenges
1. Upholding existing law
Without doubt, the crisis has confronted you with
the biggest test ever of the cohesion of the EU’s
single market. It was always going to be difficult for
the Commission to establish and maintain order in
27 (soon more) different jurisdictions. But the
crisis is a wake-up call to those complacent enough
to believe that compliance with the ‘acquis’ can be
taken for granted. The biggest test you face in the
present economic and political climate – whether
you work under the Nice Treaty or the Lisbon Treaty
–will be to uphold existing single market rules and
to prevent backsliding by individual member states,
which may attempt to switch part of the burden of
change to the businesses, workers and consumers
of other member states.
With administrative resources within the
Commission unlikely to increase appreciably and
the infringement procedure painfully slow and
blunt, you will need to enlist the support – and the
‘eyes’ – of all stakeholders, notably the European
Parliament, business, consumers  and the media, in
defending what is arguably the EU’s chief defining
policy. Otherwise there is a risk that the
Commission could become too focused on tackling
day-to-day infringement complaints and fail to spot
or give priority to bigger-picture market failures. The
Commission’s current sector reviews partly meet
this need, but a more urgent and political approach
is required.   
2. A revamped single-market strategy
At the same time as rigorously defending – and
being seen to defend – a level playing field
throughout the EU, you will be expected by many to
come up with a revamped single-market strategy,
in other words the next new ‘big idea’ which
captures the imagination of all stakeholders.
‘Business as usual’ and being a good watchdog,
however vital, will be a hard sell as a slogan for your
term. You need instead to provide a comprehensive
response to the heterogeneity currently
characterising regulation of the single market:
certain areas are considered to be over-regulated or
badly regulated; others lack effective
implementation of the existing rules; still other
areas might require further regulation. However, the
twin push to prevent single market fragmentation
and to come up with a new all-embracing project for
the single market with across-the-board appeal will
be a difficult nut to crack. This memo does not nail
down what specific areas your strategy should
tackle (it seeks to provide food for thought), but
you should devote time to reflecting on a simple
and comprehensive message which encapsulates
your ambitions for the five-year period. This will not
be straightforward, not least because of current
cynicism about the benefits of open markets and
about the ability of government at any level to
shape markets for the general good. 
3. Driving through the services directive on the
ground
You may be surprised to see the services directive
as a priority for your term of office, as it has already
been adopted and will enter into force this
December. However, the challenges awaiting the
member states – and hence the Commission – in
implementing this new set of rules fully and
properly should not be underestimated. This
directive is a key plank in the EU’s economic policy,
currently known as the Lisbon Strategy, and will
doubtless remain central to the new post-2010
strategy still to be hammered out. The new
economic agenda is likely to spotlight as one of its
priorities the improvement of the business
environment throughout Europe, including for the
services covered by single-market rules, which
according to Commission estimates make up
around 57 percent of EU GDP. 
But the directive is perhaps the most challenging
piece of legislation member states have ever been
confronted with in terms of implementation into
national law. It is a heroic ‘residual directive’ which
not only seeks to regulate business conditions in
all services sectors not already tackled by the EU,
but also aims more generally to change member
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obstacles to provision of any and all services. In
one sense it is revolutionary, as it provides for
member states to mutually evaluate, or peer-
review, each others’ rules, whereby the Commission
in a sense ‘outsources’ single-market surveillance
to member states collectively (though under the
Commission’s ultimate control).
Furthermore, the directive requires member states
to encourage action by private parties (for example
consumers’ associations) where disputes arise,
which also goes in the direction of ‘outsourcing’
surveillance and thus to harnessing multiple
stakeholders to the cause of a single market which
works ‘on the ground’. 
Needless to say, you will inevitably be faced with
delays and procrastination by member states
which will not have fulfilled all the legal and
practical requirements of the directive by the end of
this year. In light of the vital importance of the
services sector for the EU’s economies, and given
the probable reluctance of member states to open
up their services markets at a time of crisis, your
third challenge will thus be to hold a firm line and
make sure that businesses – especially SMEs –
and consumers can benefit from an obstacle-free
single market for services as swiftly as possible.   
4. Push EU global regulatory standard-setting
To a certain extent, the EU already attracts the
world’s businesses to adopt its standards by virtue
of its size alone. Indeed US companies, for example,
have already started to switch production to EU
chemicals standards as a result of the EU’s REACH
legislation (registration, evaluation and
authorisation of chemicals). But there is no room
for let-up. If foreign businesses are faced with a
fractured or fragmenting single market, they may
start to doubt the added value of aligning product
standards on the EU. Moreover, the performance
and credibility of the single market will continue to
be a key factor driving Europe’s clout in
international rule- and standard-setting bodies, not
to mention in the Commission’s negotiations with
individual third countries. In addition to vigorously
defending the single market, you can boost the EU’s
external regulatory reach by broadening and
deepening regulatory dialogue with third countries
– certainly with the US and Japan, but also with the
major emerging and developing countries. Failure to
keep the dialogue channel open, and to expand it
strategically in the best interests of European
businesses, would send the political message that
the EU is rocking back on its heels and that it does
not have faith in its own ability constantly to refine
and manage the single market properly.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 48
Recommendations
1. Upholding existing law
Upholding the existing rules is the single most
important task, especially in the current economic
and political circumstances. It is therefore
proposed to:
• Keep under constant review and evaluate any
new provisions which member states implement
as a result of the crisis and strictly apply
existing single-market rules, strengthening the
existing instrument of the single-market
scoreboard, and if possible achieving a ‘quick
win’ early in your term in order to establish your
credentials;
• Make it clear from the outset that you encourage
surveillance input from other single-market
stakeholders, and look into the possibilities of
formalising this cooperation.
2. A 2015 roadmap for the single market
Business as usual is not, on its own, a strategy for
your term of office. It is therefore proposed to:
• Invest time and effort in framing a narrative
which encapsulates the focus of your term. Your
strategy should be comprehensive and clear at
the outset to all stakeholders, thoroughly
describing your priorities, the regulatory areas
you wish to change or develop, those where
action should be left to the member states, and
your long-term horizon. The 1992 message was
simple, powerful and galvanising, although it
was and is clear that the single market is an
ongoing project. As a suggestion, your approach
might refer to the global role of Europe and its
single market, for example as a force for good in
terms of global environmental and consumer
protection.
3. A truly integrated market for services in Europe
A number of member states, possibly many, are
unlikely to have all the rules in place by the end of
this year, which will deprive businesses, especially
SMEs, and consumers of the benefits of a border-
free services market. It is therefore proposed to:
• Adopt a clear strategy towards member states
which have not put the new rules in place by the
agreed date. Help those with genuine problems,
while giving them a strict timetable to comply.
Come down hard and swiftly on those who are
failing to cooperate. Envisage a mid-term review
of the services directive during your mandate.
4. The EU as the global regulatory standard-setter
The EU’s success as a global standard-setter relies
primarily on the single market remaining intact
under the current pressure and on accommodating
the changes driven by the increasing importance of
services. But the EU also needs a coordinated
approach across its institutions, and across
Commission departments, a common external
‘face’ to defend, explain and promote the single
market to third country governments and
businesses. It is therefore proposed to:
• Coordinate European stakeholders’ efforts to
define a global regulatory standard-setting
approach for the EU;
• Use the EU’s external standard-setting power as
an additional argument to convince EU
governments to play ball and respect single-
market rules, and to get EU businesses with
export interests to help you police it;
• Expand the regulatory dialogue with third
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To: The Commissioner for Enterprise and
Industry Policy 
From: André Sapir and Nicolas Véron
Subject: Priorities for your term of office
Date: 1 September 2009bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 52
State of affairs
THE CONCEPT OF ‘INDUSTRIAL POLICY’ was the
subject of repeated controversies for many years in
the European Union. It pitted the advocates of
‘horizontal’ measures that support economic
activities such as innovation against those in
favour of ‘vertical’ measures targeting specific
sectors. Since the early 1990s the consensus at EU
level has been that the main role of EU industrial
policy is to provide the right framework conditions
for business. This view corresponded to the
perception that the main challenge for European
industry was to adapt to a global economic context
characterised by rapid technological change and
the emergence of new competitors, fortunately at a
time of fast-growing world markets. After having
successfully caught up with the US in the first few
decades following the second world war, European
industry had to succeed at the frontier of
innovation and business transformation, an
environment which, in contrast to the earlier
catching-up process, provided little scope for state-
led steering of the economy as a whole. In response
to this challenge, the core of EU industrial policy in
the past two decades has been, first, the single
market programme and then the Lisbon
programme, which both aimed at improving
competitiveness in a ‘horizontal’, non sector-
specific manner. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the commissioner in
charge of industrial affairs was also responsible for
the single market, which gave him great influence
in the shaping of EU industrial policy. From 1994
on, however, this link was severed, depriving the
industrial affairs commissioner of key policy tools.
The launch of the Lisbon programme in 2000 has
only accentuated this trend: although your
immediate predecessor was nominally in charge of
it, the reality was that he had little impact on the
framework conditions for business since most of
the associated policies – on the single market,
competition, trade, research, higher education,
social and macroeconomic affairs –were under the
direct responsibility of other commissioners. Hence
your predecessor found himself in the odd position
of being nominally in charge of industrial policy
without having much actual say on its design and
implementation.
It would be a mistake to see your portfolio as the irrelevant legacy of a
bygone era. The response to some of the challenges created by the
global crisis falls naturally under your responsibility. bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 53
IN SPITE OF THE TRENDover the last two decades, it
would be a mistake to see your portfolio as the
somewhat irrelevant legacy of a bygone era. The
reason is that the response to some of the new
challenges created by the global crisis falls
naturally under your responsibility given the
division of labour within the Commission.
Specifically, you will be seen as partly responsible
for the management of the immediate effects of
falling demand and constrained credit in
manufacturing and non-financial services, a
responsibility that should form the basis of your
policy priorities. 
European industry is in dire straits, with production
falling at record speed. Between May 2008 and May
2009, industrial production in the EU27 has
declined by 15.9 percent. The fall has been
particularly severe in intermediate goods (22.5
percent), capital goods (21.2 percent) and
consumer durables (17.2 percent). In some
sectors, like automobiles, production is down by
nearly 30 percent. Moreover, a number of industry
segments are going to hit a wall of refinancing
needs over the coming months and years. Even
assuming that the worst of the financial crisis is
behind us, massive economic damage and
restructuring can be expected in large swathes of
Europe’s industrial base. 
In this gloomy environment, you will face three
crucial, interlinked challenges. 
The first challenge is to avoid the ‘zombification’ of
Europe’s economy. There will be huge temptation
for governments to encourage or force banks to
provide credit to businesses which are not viable in
their current form, to prevent those businesses
from restructuring if that means significant
numbers of redundancies, and frantically to
repress the spreading of related bad news even if it
is entirely accurate. Such action would turn banks
into ‘zombie banks’, de factoinsolvent but unwilling
to recognise it and protected by national
authorities, and would simultaneously turn non-
financial companies into ‘zombie companies’,
unviable but pretending to continue their
operations as before the crisis. We know from
experience, especially Japan’s, that this would put
a significant drag on Europe’s mid-term growth. 
The  second challenge is to ensure that the
legitimate concern of dampening the shock of
adjustment does not overshadow the focus on
competitiveness which, as previously mentioned,
has appropriately defined the EU’s industrial policy
over the past two decades. In times like these, the
minds of policymakers and business leaders are
focused on survival and adaptation rather than
innovation and competitiveness. But the two are by
no means contradictory. Specifically, the credit
crunch may have a disproportionate effect in
constraining innovation, research and development
in hard-pressed companies. 
The  third challenge is to ensure that the policy
responses to the crisis do not weaken European
economic integration. Large industrial companies,
like cross-border banks, tend in the words of the
well-known quote to be ‘international in life, but
national in death’. Indeed, given that the EU
institutions have no fiscal discretion, it is most
often to national governments that they have
turned for help during the crisis. There is a distinct
risk that government action will lead to the
fragmentation of Europe’s single market, which
ranks among the EU’s most valuable but also most
fragile assets. 
These three challenges lead to three
recommendations.
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Recommendations
FIRST, YOU SHOULD STRIVE TIRELESSLY to educate
the European public and fellow policymakers about
the risk of ‘zombification’ and the need to accept
restructuring in order to enable the EU economy
eventually to rebound, taking into account the
lessons of Japan’s ‘lost decade’ and the massive
misallocation of capital that characterised it. At the
same time, you should add your voice to those
demanding better social protection for affected
workers. Refusing to create zombie firms which
protect existing jobs when there is no longer
sufficient demand for their output should not be
synonymous with a refusal to protect workers. 
Second, you should defend the vision of a European
Union that builds leadership in frontier innovation
(whether technological, green or otherwise) and
breeds world-class new companies, because that is
the only vision that can maintain the prosperity of
Europe’s citizens in a rapidly changing globalised
economy. Your vision of industrial policy should not
aim at the creation of ‘European champions’, an
approach that, more often than not, has led to
waste or failure, but should rather be designed to
create the right framework conditions for success,
as the Commission has sought to do over the past
two decades. 
Third, we suggest that you depart from your
predecessors’ hands-off approach to industrial
policy during the past 20 years, and make the
restructuring of industries severely damaged by
the crisis the main focus of your term. This is a
temporary task, and it does not answer the long-
term question of your portfolio’s relevance in
normal times, which the memo to the president
suggests merging with the internal market
portfolio. But it is crucial, because we fear that
existing policy tools such as competition policy and
single-market policy will not suffice to meet the
challenges given the magnitude of the economic
shock. EU-wide strategic direction is needed for the
scale of industrial restructuring that now seems
due, and neither these two policies nor national
governments can provide it. 
In dealing with this task, you may wish to look
closely at the experience of Etienne Davignon, your
predecessor in the late 1970s and early 1980s
when national governments’ support of troubled
sectors threatened what was then the common
market. The ‘Davignon Plan’ implemented in the
1980s was a response by the European
Commission to measures introduced by
governments in support of their national steel
industry that were suffering from chronic
overcapacity due to changing market conditions.
Rather than seeking to eliminate state aid, it chose
t o  a c c e p t  i t  i n  e x c h a n g e  f o r  c o o r d i n a t e d
restructuring plans that drastically reduced
production capacity. 
A similar approach could now be used specifically in
the automotive sector, which also suffers from
structural overcapacity as a result of changing
market conditions (including competition from new
EU countries, rising oil prices and concerns about
climate change) and has been badly hit by the
crisis. Granted, the powers of the Commission in the
automotive sector are not at all what they were in
the steel sector under the European Coal and Steel
Community framework, and the two industries are
anyway very different. Yet Davignon’s approach of
joint action by the member states, spearheaded by
the Commission, could usefully be replicated today
in a sector sorely in need of restructuring needs
and plagued by national state aid. 
In terms of policy action, we recommend that you
initiate the formation of industry-specific EU task
forces that would help you in coordinating national
governments’ moves and suggesting relevant EU
decisions. Such task forces would report to you and
would not wield policy instruments of their own but,
if well designed and managed, could play a
powerful role in providing shared understanding of
industry dynamics and in being a catalyst for joint
action in situations where a fragmentation of policy
initiatives is leading to demonstrably inefficient
outcomes. 
At the moment, we think only the automotive
industry would be concerned, but other cases may
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consequences of the crisis unfold. We suggest that
you consider the banking and financial industry as
outside your scope of action because of its
specificities as being both a cause of, and a
solution to, the crisis. Otherwise, any
manufacturing or non-financial services sector
may be concerned, provided the extent of
difficulties justifies intervention at EU rather than
national or local level. 
The EU task forces should be sufficiently skilled,
focused and empowered to make an impact. First,
skills: you should maximise flexibility as to their
staffing, including task force chairs, by both public
officials (including from member states) and
individuals with private-sector experience. In spite
of the many talents currently present in your
department, they cannot be up to the challenge of
steering the transformation of entire industries
without significant external (and temporary) help.
Second, focus: you should give any EU task force a
clear mandate and protect them from being
constantly distracted by requests from this or that
member state or constituent on issues of minor
importance. Third, empowerment: you should seek
member states’ explicit endorsement of task force
formation and mandates, accept significant
operational delegation of initiative to task force
chairs and staff, and build the corresponding
channels of accountability, not only to EU
institutions and member states but also to national
parliaments. To have impact, the task forces will
need to build a public profile and legitimacy, even
though they will ultimately report to you. 
Such EU task forces can provide you and your
Commission colleagues with the indispensable
direction and consistency that is needed for other
policymakers at national and EU level to make the
right decisions. Their creation and operation will not
be consensual but correspond to a need that is
already acknowledged by many stakeholders. They
should not be seen as a substitute for EU policies
such as those on competition or the internal
market, but rather as an indispensable complement
given the pressures created by the crisis.
Coordination with state aid policy will be especially
crucial. Although the goal would be to rein in state
aid, special arrangements for state aid review could
be introduced in specific sectors if their
restructuring plans were deemed appropriate for
this by the EU task force. Altogether, it is an ironic
but unmistakable reversal of pre-crisis times that
an active industrial strategy now needs to be
conducted, by you, to ensure that the single market
is adequately defended.
It is an ironic but unmistakable reversal of pre-crisis times that an
active industrial strategy now needs to be conducted, to ensure
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To: The Commissioner for Knowledge
From: Bruno van Pottelsberghe
Subject: Priorities for your term of office
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State of affairs
CURRENT SITUATION: A 30 PERCENT ‘KNOWLEDGE
OUTPUT GAP’ WITH THE US
With nearly 500 million inhabitants the European
Union is an important player in the global research
landscape. An important, but ailing one! 
In the early 2000s the EU member states agreed
t h a t  E u r o p e  w a s  t o  b e c o m e  t h e  ‘ w o r l d ’ s  m o s t
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based
economy by 2010’. Their ambitious self-set Lisbon
agenda included a precise target: three percent of
GDP was to be devoted to research and
development (R&D) activities by 2010, one third of
which was to be funded by the public sector. Nearly
ten years later the evidence tends to show that at
most limited progress has been achieved, but
nothing significant compared with the original
objective. In terms of ultimate ‘output’ of innovative
activities and competitiveness, the EU’s
productivity performance (GDP per capita) remains
at 70 percent of the US level. Knowledge generation
(total R&D spending as a share of GDP) has been
characterised by a similarly poor relative
performance. The US is close to the three-percent
target (about 2.7 percent), whereas the EU has for
about 20 years managed an R&D intensity hovering
below two percent, with no sign of movement
towards its Lisbon target. And a key vector of
knowledge dissemination and accessibility – ICT
investment as a percentage of GDP – is performing
just as poorly. Likewise, the ability of Europe to
attract foreign brains is much less effective than
that of the US. This is worrying for the sustainability
of European economic growth, because innovation
and information technologies are key drivers of
long-term growth.
Knowledge policy is far from being an exclusive
competence of the EU. Research is mainly funded
by an independent business sector and by the
public sector of individual member states, and
often by regional authorities with no or very little
coordination. The EU’s own Framework Programmes
account for about five percent of total public
funding for civilian research activities in Europe: a
significant amount compared to the size of the
overall EU budget but small when compared to total
spending on research activities.  For the record, the
EU’s 7th Framework Programme (2007-2011) has
a budget of more than €50.5 billion, of which 64
percent goes to collaborative research, 15 percent
to frontier research through the ERC (European
Research Council), and the rest to research
mobility, infrastructure and the EU’s Joint Research
Centres. Despite identifiable progress in recent
years, the lion’s share of this funding –
collaborative R&D – is still subject to three main
criticisms: the burden of red tape, cumbersome
conditions governing the geographical spread of
partnering institutions, and an opaque fund-
allocation mechanism which is influenced by
national insistence on getting their money back
from the EU budget. The inevitable consequence is a
drop-off in business-sector participation. 
But knowledge generation is more effective when
funnelled through higher education policy and
training. Here again, Europe’s overall higher
education expenditure (1.3 percent of GDP) is
much lower than in the US (2.9 percent). Besides,
Europe’s national education systems are still
highly disparate, despite progress in coordinating
systems under the Bologna Agreement. The
weaknesses of European education systems lie in a
lack of transparency, different governance systems
across countries, network-based competition for
promotion of senior academic staff (as opposed to
excellence-based competition); tenured positions
frequently reserved for national or internal staff; a
lack of managerial autonomy in several countries; a
lack of funding to ensure a minimum level of
quality, and administrative and legal obstacles to
intra-EU mobility (transferability of social security
and/or research funding). These shortcomings
have had two negative consequences:  very poor
research performance according to international
rankings, and a relative lack of attractiveness of
European universities for students originating from
Asian and other emerging and developing
countries.
The work of the research commissioner over the
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in place a European Research Area (ERA) that would
by 2020 span geographical, sectoral and
institutional boundaries. Its ultimate objective is to
‘extend the single European market to the world of
research and technological development, ensuring
open and transparent trade in scientific and
technological skills, ideas and know-how’. In other
words, besides funding tools for projects ranging
from basic to applied research, the Commission is
aiming to improve coordination within the EU and
offers a platform for best practice in science and
technology policy. The Commission’s Green Paper
on the European Research Area: New Perspectives
adopted in early 2007 identified six fields for
action, namely: realising a single labour market for
researchers; developing world-class research
infrastructure; strengthening research institutions;
sharing knowledge; optimising research
programmes and priorities; and opening R&D
activity to the world through international science
and technology cooperation.
From a very specific, well-defined and probably too
restrictive objective set in the early 2000s (the
three-percent R&D intensity target), the
operational objective has now switched towards a
more glamorous – though unverifiable – target,
namely the ERA. The advantage of this second
approach is that failure is difficult to establish in
objective terms: indicators can always be
computed to illustrate success in one dimension of
the ERA or the other.
The weaknesses of European education systems have had negative
consequences:  very poor research performance, and a relative lack of
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Challenges
YOUR MAIN CHALLENGES ARE THREEFOLD: i) fielding
the likely reaction to failure to meet the Lisbon
spending target; ii) improving the effectiveness of
EU funding and its accessibility for the business
sector; iii) contributing to the development of the
ERA and the creation of a single market for
knowledge.
Your challenges are accentuated by the limited
amount of resources and hard-law leverage at your
disposal: budgets and regulatory tools are mostly
controlled by member states or their regions.
The first challenge concerns the likely decision of
the Council to uphold the three-percent R&D
intensity target. This is potentially hard to achieve,
as very little momentum for this is observable at EU
level. However, the target has the advantage of
being simple (hence easy to communicate) and
well defined. But while the creation of new
knowledge is mostly driven by high-quality
research institutions and R&D funding, its
dissemination is essentially driven by higher-
education expenditures. Having a two-dimensional
target for generation and dissemination of
knowledge would give countries more freedom to
select their own priority within the spectrum of
knowledge policy.
The second challenge is to improve the
effectiveness and attractiveness of EU public
funding of research, ie. to maximise its likelihood of
succeeding, its socio-economic impact and its
stimulating effect on business R&D. Chances of
success and tangible socio-economic impact
depend on selecting the most appropriate projects
and on competent researchers. This, in turn,
depends on the ability to attract competitive
institutions with efficient research departments.
The challenge for the EU’s Framework Programmes
and other research funding projects is therefore to
make them more user-friendly and open. 
The third challenge is to contribute to the creation
of a single market for knowledge in Europe. This
objective requires the implementation of many
structural changes in individual member state.
First, there is a need for highly qualified
researchers to fuel new research activities, which
would call for both improved mobility of European
researchers within the EU and easier access for
non-EU brains and talent. Better-trained
researchers are also needed through improved
tertiary education systems. An effective European
Research Area should also reduce duplication of
research activities. There is currently only a very
small degree of coordination within the EU of
resource allocation for basic and applied research
implemented by public institutions. Most regional
policies include ‘fashionable’ objectives such as
nano- and biotechnology, or life sciences. Whereas
some research duplication can be good in order to
maximise the probability of discovery, excessive
duplication reduces funding for new and promising
scientific and technological areas. The European
Space Agency (ESA) is one example of EU-wide
coordination of research activities. The governance
of the ERC could also become a benchmark for
other European research programmes. Its bottom-
up approach, relative independence and high-
quality project selection process has nurtured a
strong degree of confidence. Unfortunately most
national or regional government-sponsored
programmes are not coordinated, which leads to
wasteful duplication. Here the challenge is
considerable, as local governments will tend to
resist the dictates of a centralised institution.
An effective European Research Area should reduce duplication of
research. There is currently only a very small degree of coordination
within the EU of resource allocation for basic and applied research.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 61
Recommendations
1. Negotiate with the Council on new spending
targets to be achieved by the EU: an aggregate
knowledge spend of  five percent of GDP to be
achieved by 2014
Two types of expenditure are at the root of
sustainable growth: education and research. The
sum of R&D intensity and higher-education
expenditure as a share of GDP should increase from
the current 3.2 percent (against 5.6 percent in the
US) to five percent by the year 2014. This new
‘knowledge-intensity’ target approach would
provide much-needed and welcome room for
manoeuvre for member states, given their differing
industrial specialisations and levels of economic
development. Countries that are highly specialised
in service industries would focus on fostering
higher education, whereas other countries might
choose to reinforce research activities. The
common denominator here is knowledge
generation and dissemination. 
2. Improve the size, effectiveness and
attractiveness of the research funding
distributed under the EU’s Framework
Programmes (starting with the new FP8).
The EU’s Framework Programmes are essential for
attaining critical mass in many fields of scientific
research, attracting business funding and
facilitating multidisciplinarity. By 2011 the
content, design and tools of FP8 will have to be
defined, in addition to the size of its budget. As
compared to FP7, you should work to improve the
attractiveness of framework programmes for both
the business and academic sectors, for instance by
seeking to adopt key parts of the ERC governance
model for the FPs:
• Improved transparency, and a move away from
the ‘money-back’ logic of member states;
• A bottom-up approach, with a high-quality and
independent selection process;
• Simpler and lighter administrative procedures;
• A smaller set of more straightforward funding
channels, with more flexibility and freedom and
stronger management autonomy. 
3. Achieve identifiable progress towards the ERA
through excellence-based policies and by
supporting other commissioners’ targets.
The creation of a single market for knowledge
generation and dissemination requires material
progress in many fields which are not under your
direct control. Four specific policies could
substantially contribute to the ERA, of which three
may not fall under your portfolio but should receive
your active support:
• Creation of an ‘excellence initiative’ for higher-
education institutions, through which a new
European test would be created to identify
excellent students and the best ‘learning’
institutions;
• Policies aiming at attracting and keeping foreign
talent, in particular by means of an improved ‘EU
Blue Card’ for non-EU labour (with better
portability and a longer period of validity), and
possibly an ‘EU Blue Diploma’;
• Effective and simplified mobility for researchers
and scientists within Europe, in particular by
providing a retirement pension scheme valid
throughout the EU to talented researchers or
professors;
• Creation of a single market for technology
through the adoption of the Community patent.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 62bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 63
To: The Commissioner for Climate Change
From: Reinhilde Veugelers
Subject: Priorities for your term of office
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Challenges
THIS MEMO IS DRAFTEDon the assumption that the
new Commission will have a dedicated climate
change commissioner. This would not only signal
the importance attached by the Commission and its
president to climate change, but would also render
policymaking more effective, as I will argue further
in the note.
First, you will have myriad objectives – a veritable
‘ M e d u s a ’ s ’  h e a d  o f  c h a l l e n g e s  –  t o  c o n s i d e r .
Beyond fighting global warming, you will also be
confronted with energy efficiency, energy security
and pure-play political concerns (not dealt with in
these memos), and last but not least economic and
societal concerns related to growth and jobs. These
objectives do not necessarily all align and may
even be at variance with each other.  
Second, the climate change challenge is
characterised by high and skewed uncertainty.
First, there is uncertainty regarding the size of the
problem. This starts with a lack of consensus on
how big the change in climate is and is going to be.
In this discussion, the change in (land and sea)
temperature is the focal point of attention and
carbon dioxide emissions are the central causal
factor considered. Model predictions of these
parameters produce wide confidence intervals,
with an (albeit small) probability of extreme
disasters to deal with. The tendency emerging from
the more recent models is to predict bigger effects
than those used previously*. A second source of
uncertainty is the effect of global warming on
overall economic welfare and societal well-being
and its distribution across countries, groups within
countries and generations. Also tricky is the
valuation of losses not measured in the market
place, such as the disruption of societies and
political instability.  
In addition, you have a wide set of possible policy
instruments (including taxes, subsidies, public
investment, regulation, standards and permits), all
of which you will need to use, but with many
unknowns in terms of their effectiveness,
efficiency and equity.  
What is more, the current crisis will not make your
life easier. Although it may provide a short windfall
benefit in the form of lower CO2 emissions, at the
same time it temporarily weakens the power of
fossil fuel price rises to incentivise climate change
action. The financial crisis also affects the provision
of finance for green investments, private as well as
public. And the crisis makes it politically much more
difficult to even broach the question of a carbon tax,
although it might all things considered be among
the better policy instruments to use.  
But to end the challenges section of this memo on a
positive note, you will enjoy increasing recognition
and support for the climate change agenda, not
o n l y  f r o m  t h e  p u b l i c  a t  l a r g e ,  b u t  a l s o  f r o m  t h e
corporate sector in the EU and among the EU’s main
partners such as the US and China. The UN Climate
Change Conference in Copenhagen in December
2009 will provide much momentum to the public
debate. But a higher level of public support and
awareness of climate change issues does not
guarantee a common stance among the
participating governments on how (urgently) the
problem needs to be tackled, thus dampening
Copenhagen’s chances of substantive immediate
success.
* The prediction errors have been mostly on the effect of CO2 in the atmosphere on climate variables, less so on the CO2
emissions themselves. Recent data show that the rise in the global mean surface temperature (land and ocean combined) was
in 2006 already 0.3°C higher compared to the trend line value in 1990, which was the base year of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) scenarios. This value is in the upper part of the range projected by the IPCC.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 65
What is needed?
WITH COPENHAGEN NOT LIKELY to bring a major
paradigm shift in global climate-change policies,
most of the pre-Copenhagen discussions will
continue to run thereafter: the post-Copenhagen
agenda you will inherit when taking office will most
probably not look that much different from today’s
agenda.  
Your experts will probably tell you that your agenda
will basically be taken up, and achieved, by
implementing the EU’s ‘20/20/20’ climate-change
plan. But the recent updates based on the currently
available scientific evidence (amongst others
Rahmstorf, the recent PEW Climate Organisation
conclusions), make clear that the EU targets, even
if successfully implemented, will be insufficient. In
addition, it is now also clear that currently available
technologies, and the current speed of progress in
new technologies, will not be up to addressing the
challenges. We will need to foster paradigm shifts
and new breakthrough innovations (‘backstop
technologies’). And finally, although international
coordination has been improving since Kyoto and,
it is hoped, will continue to improve after
Copenhagen, the global governance of climate-
change is unfit for purpose.    
In tackling the climate-change challenges we are
faced with, we need a policy strategy that is much
more pro-growth than what we have seen so f ar .
Taking a more pro-growth perspective implies
seeing climate change as an opportunity – even
now, and perhaps especially now – as we can use
the crisis as ‘creative-destruction momentum’ for
change and as a lever to put the EU economy on a
sustainable post-recovery growth path.  Such a pro-
growth approach would help to give ‘push-back’ to
the many who see the climate-change agenda as a
cost that needs to be contained.  
Taking a pro-growth perspective does not mean
ignoring the costs of fighting climate change, nor
naively thinking that climate-change action will
create a massive number of green jobs and steep
future growth. It implies seeing the cost-benefit
trade-offs in a new perspective.
First, on the benefit side, the growth we should be
aiming for is sustainable growth, properly taking
into account the quality of our environment. This
implies using a different metric than the traditional
GDP calculations we are using now to assess the
costs and benefits.
Second, whether more or less sustainable growth
will be created depends on which benchmark is
used. The proper benchmark to weigh policy
actions is how the world would look in the absence
of action: ie. more polluted, warmer, unhealthy and
with more people dislocated. The benchmark of no
action is unfortunately not the extrapolation of
‘business as usual’. There is a cost to non-action
that needs to be factored in. Unfortunately, in view
of the many uncertainties inherent in climate
change as discussed above, it is difficult to be
precise about the cost of inaction*. But it is not
because they are uncertain or difficult to value that
we should ignore these costs. When due regard is
given to downside risks, the cost of inaction is any
case very high. Relative to this benchmark, the cost
of fighting climate change is likely to be much
lower, at least if sensible policies are enacted
globally
†. Together with a factoring-in of the quality
of growth on the benefits side, these arguments
make a pro-growth perspective easier to defend vis-
à-vis the cost-containment advocates. But not
easier to implement, given the big ‘if’ related to the
feasibility of sensible, globally enacted pro-growth
policies.
* As discussed, the cost of doing nothing depends on, first, how fast greenhouse gases will build up in the atmosphere if
‘business as usual’ is allowed to continue; second, what impact that build-up will have on climatic conditions around the world;
and, third, what the impact of the ensuing climate change will be and how we value that impact.
† The Stern Review estimates the cost to be around one percent of GDP forever in order to stabilise greenhouse gas emission to
550ppm CO2e, thus avoiding a loss of five to 20 percent of GDP foreverbruegel memos to the new commission 2009 66
Some principles for a pro-growth climate-change
policy:
1. A more pivotal role for the development of new
technologies 
Technologies include those for mitigation (low- or
no-carbon technologies such as biofuels,
renewables, solar, wind, nuclear), carbon capture
and storage, energy efficiency) as well as for
adapting to climate change.
A Green Technology Policy should operate in three
different areas:
• Improving the dissemination of existing
technologies;
• Developing/scaling up near-commercial
technologies in the pipeline; 
• Creating new breakthrough innovations
(backstop technologies).
Most of the policy attention regarding green
innovation is directed to the first two areas. All too
often green innovation is promoted through
industry policy-type intervention, supporting
particular technologies through subsidies or tax
incentives, often at the expense of others. Given the
notoriously bad record of governments in picking
winning technologies, and especially in green
innovation where technological and market
uncertainties still abound, a more horizontal policy
approach establishing more general framework
conditions, and supporting a portfolio of
technologies, is more advisable. 
But particularly the third area – breakthrough
innovation – requires more policy attention. The
climate-change debate as it relates to technology
should move beyond assessing the short-term
impact and adoption of currently available or near-
commercial technologies and look more at the
potential for developing major breakthrough
innovations, often emerging from non-incumbent
players. Market failures are the highest in this area
and it therefore requires extra policy attention.
While these innovations will only be coming
onstream and helping growth and jobs in the longer
term, the foundations of these paradigm shifts
need to be built now. Particularly in the area of
energy storage, battery technologies need to be
nurtured.   
2. The need to be much more market-based
Through a strong policy framework which provides
the requisite economic incentives for consumers
and producers to invest and adopt climate change-
friendly technologies, governments should harness
the power of markets to find an effective response
to the climate-change challenge.  In order to have
innovative markets and entrepreneurship working
to combat climate change, that policy framework
must be credible, and predictable:
• A price for carbon that is sufficiently high and
predictable to serve as an incentive for carbon-
saving investments is obtained in the most
straightforward way through a carbon tax.  This
is why the carbon tax instrument is usually
preferred by economists. Although the cap-and-
trade system in your portfolio can also do the
trick, this nevertheless requires a lot of
information and expertise to get the emission-
allocation process right, creating more room for
error and exposure to political pressure.
Nevertheless, given that current political
momentum is in favour of cap-and-trade rather
than a carbon tax – not least because of
perennial national sensitivities about any EU
intervention in the tax domain –  you need to
make the cap-and-trade system as pro-growth
as possible. This requires regularly evaluating its
effects and adapting when necessary. This
evaluation should go beyond measuring the
short-term reduction in CO2 emissions and also
consider whether it provides, through a
sufficiently high and predictable carbon price, an
adequate incentive to generate the necessary
investment in innovation for the future.
• Myriad government regulations shape
incentives for green investments, some of them
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them originate in member states, but some
come from the EU level. A green dynamic
efficiency perspective should be incorporated
when reassessing existing regulations and when
designing new regulations.
• Competition for the net returns to green
investments is perhaps the strongest incentive
for firms to invest in green technologies, calling
for a green dynamic efficiency perspective in
competition policy.
3. The need for a global policy perspective
In view of the large and global nature of the
problem, public and private resources will need to
be mobilised to generate new ideas for fighting
climate change wherever they are located. And
when new ideas are developed they should be
disseminated to users, wherever they are located.
This implies a global, or at least a globally
coordinated, policy response.
Although the effects of climate change are
unevenly distributed across the globe (with the
developing countries affected most), climate
change is a challenge faced all over the world. This
does not necessarily imply that all parties agree on
how to tackle it. With the US finally showing more
openness, particularly tricky is the position of large
emerging powers such China and India, which may
be reluctant to shoulder a share in any globally set
CO2 targets commensurate with their current and
future emission levels, focusing rather on their past
emission levels.  
Should negotiators consider a border tax or other
adjustments for products from those countries
failing to agree adequately to reduce their CO2
levels?  Or should they be less ambitious as to their
own targets when others fail? While credible non-
compliance measures must form part of any good
agreement, it is on balance best to avoid having to
revert to such penalties as much as possible by
reaching an equitable overall agreement in the first
place that takes into account the specific
capabilities and constraints of all players involved.
This means taking into account that countries like
China and India may have big CO2 flows, but still
have a smaller stock of CO2 emissions than big
players. It also means taking into account that they
still have insufficient means to absorb the latest
technologies (although they have a large –
potential – pool of scientific and technological
brains to develop new ideas for fighting climate
change and to bring them to market more cheaply).
In approaching the competitiveness debate, it will
pay to avoid an excessively short-term, local-
champion protectionist approach and to bear in
mind that longer-term competitiveness will involve
globally agreed and sustainable solutions.
In the competitiveness debate, it will pay to avoid a short-term,
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Recommendations
A PRO-GROWTH APPROACH does not require a
complete overhaul of past EU policies.   Pro-growth
principles are already discernable in the existing EU
20/20/20 plan.  But they were sub-optimally
developed. A more serious pro-growth approach to
climate change, better able to deal with the
challenges we are facing, requires a change in
current EU policymaking. It calls for an EU
20/20/20 Mark II.  
Your new, dedicated post as a commissioner for
climate change is a necessary condition for the
success of Mark II. A pro-growth approach requires
more intensive coordination across policy areas
(energy, environment, competition, internal
market, research, trade, budget...). By being in
effect a European climate-change czar, you will
have a mandate to cross-cut the various
departments, mobilising and coordinating with
your fellow commissioners and other stakeholders.   
A dedicated commissioner is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for Mark II. It also requires the
enactment of sensible, pro-growth policies. In
choosing the policy action in which you will invest,
you need to think carefully where policymaking
adds the most value to – and can complement –
action at member-state level.   
Bearing in mind this subsidiarity rationale, your
policy action should concentrate on:
1. Improving the incentivising effect of the
European cap-and-trade system (ECTS) 
As the ECTS is now the established route in the EU to
pricing carbon, you need to ensure that it is an
effective, incentivising, pro-growth climate-change
instrument. To this end, the procedure for issuing
permits should be delegated to a newly set-up
independent agency, a kind of ECCB (European
Climate Change Bank). This independent executive
agency should be able to provide highly qualified
and independent expertise in order to translate
clearly set targets into permit schemes. This should
give the ECTS a better chance of generating a
sufficiently high and predictable carbon price. 
2. Taking a leading role in international
coordination of climate-change action
Relying on its experience of governing intra-EU
coordination of member states, the EU should take
a leading role in international negotiations on
climate change by:
• Developing a roadmap for an international cap-
and-trade system, or at least international
linkage of the cap-and-trade systems of major
players, in particular the US. This would include
removing barriers to trading permits across
different systems;
• Developing an efficient as well as equitable
financing scheme for climate-change action by
less-developed countries, given that the current
Clean Development Mechanism is clearly
insufficient:
• You should propose a transfer of funds to
cash-constrained developing countries for
developing or acquiring green technologies;
• As an alternative to providing these countries
with funds for acquiring green technology,
you could also consider providing green
technologies to them at subsidised prices;
• Countries should contribute to this fund on
the basis of stocks of past emissions, a
criterion* which would address the concerns
raised by fast-growing countries.    
3. Stimulating breakthrough new technologies
The role of the EU in green technology is particularly
important in: 
• Public funding of green basic R&D through the
EU’s R&D Framework Programmes and other
funding;
• Coordinating green research with international
* The starting year for calculating these stocks should be an agreed date at which awareness of the climate-change challenge
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(non-EU) partners; 
• Providing a large, integrated EU output market
for green investments;
• Coordinating clear and time-consistent green
regulation, standard- setting and public
procurement.    
I would like to close with a few very specific
suggestions.  These could be your ‘quick wins’,
clearly marking your arrival in office and showing
your commitment and resolve to take the climate-
change agenda beyond rhetoric: 
• A green ‘YICs’ programme: The programme
would fund project proposals from young
innovative companies (YICs) to help bring to
market highly innovative and pathbreaking
ideas for climate change;
• The European Commission as green leader: the
European Commission should set a good
example with its own green procurement. To
name but a few ideas: the car pool of the
commissioners should include hybrids, electric
cars; its building procurement should reflect the
principles set out in its own Sustainable
Construction Lead Market Initiative.
Pro-growth principles are discernable in the EU 20/20/20 plan.  But
they were sub-optimally developed. A more serious pro-growth
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To: The Commissioner for Employment, Social
Affairs and Equal Opportunities
From: Jakob von Weizsäcker
Subject: Priorities for your term of office
Date: 1 September 2009bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 72
State of affairs
AS A CONSEQUENCE of the current economic crisis,
unemployment rates in most EU countries are set
to soar to double-digit rates in 2010 and the return
to pre-crisis levels of unemployment is likely to take
several years. This will put considerable strain on
the social fabric of societies throughout Europe.
This strain will be increased by ideological
disorientation. Socialism has failed for good.
Confidence in capitalism has also suffered as a
result of the crisis. Globalisation is no longer viewed
as utterly inevitable but as a surprisingly fragile
construct which needs to be organised and
regulated better. 
Calls to strengthen the social dimension of Europe
and of globalisation will intensify. A TNS opinion
survey in the run-up to the 2009 European
Parliament elections identified unemployment as
the top concern for 57 percent of Europeans,
followed by economic growth (45 percent),
insecurity (32 percent) and the future of pensions
(31 percent), well ahead of other broad concerns
such as climate change, terrorism or inflation. Yet
there is no obvious common European or global
vision on which to build. Despite full awareness by
all participants of the major labour-market impact
of the crisis by 2010, the main messages that
emerged from the recent employment summit did
not add to the minimal consensus on employment
policy of which member states and social partners
were capable before the crisis. 
Finding common ground at the European level may
well become even harder because the speed at
which member states will recover from the crisis is
likely to vary considerably more between countries
than did the timing of the initial economic shock of
the crisis. Furthermore, there is a risk that currency
devaluations and sector-specific support measures
designed to save jobs in one country at the
expense of another country might poison relations
within the EU and between the EU and other
economies. 
In summary, the new employment commissioner
will be confronted with increased demand for a
social Europe but an environment that may make it
even more difficult to deliver than today.
The new employment commissioner will be confronted with
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Policy tools
THE EMPLOYMENT COMMISSIONER has essentially
three distinct toolsets at his disposal to shape
policy. The first toolset consists of executive
powers and powers of legislative initiative.
However, compared to policy areas such as
competition, trade and the single market, the scope
for action in the area of employment and social
protection is much more limited. The main reason
for this is that member states have jealously
guarded their national sovereignty in social
matters, and this is set to remain the case even if
the Lisbon Treaty is finally adopted. As a result,
ambitious and successful EU legislative initiatives
have been rare in recent years, apart from those
linked to internal mobility within the EU or the
largely generic non-discrimination agenda.
The second tool is spending power. You have the
third-highest budget within the European
Commission, amounting to €11.5 billion in 2008
(or almost 10 percent of the EU’s annual budget).
Only the commissioners for agriculture (€57.7
billion) and for regional policy (€40.0 billion) had
bigger budgets in 2008. Concerning your budget,
almost all expenditures relate to the European
Social Fund (ESF), the oldest of the EU’s structural
funds going back all the way to 1957 and the Treaty
of Rome. Unfortunately, the track record of the ESF
is mixed and the incentives for either the
Commissioner or member states properly to
evaluate the impact of ESF spending are weak. But
significant changes to the way in which the ESF
operates are hard to achieve. The reason is that
there are powerful stakeholders broadly in favour of
the status quo – in particular the poorer countries
and regions in the EU and the social partners. These
stakeholders will watch closely over any attempts
to change the system, worrying about the adverse
consequences such changes could entail with
respect to the allocation of funds and their effective
control.
Third, there is the instrument of thought leadership
– the commissioner can initiate debates – and the
power of persuasion. This third instrument will
prove to be critical in helping to unlock the two
other instruments mentioned above. But this will
not be easy as long as Council debates on
employment policy are ‘remote-controlled’ by
bodies such as the Employment Committee, in
which member states ‘script’ the Council meetings,
in the process choking off free-range political
debate at ministerial level.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 74
The flexicurity challenge
HELPING TO END this political stalemate at the
European level well before unemployment in the EU
is likely to peak in 2010 is a critical challenge for
you and the new Commission. The stakes are high
because the situation on European labour markets
– and in EU treasuries – in 2010 may readily
destroy the most important conceptual pillar of
European employment policy beyond pure regional
policy: the notion of flexicurity. 
Flexicurity will come under pressure on two fronts.
First, the returns to labour market flexibility will be
unusually low in 2010. The simple reason is that
the rise in unemployment will be attributable
primarily to a macro shock that sends essentially
all sectors into decline, with hardly anybody willing
to hire. Therefore, the main upside of flexibility,
namely that it enables swift reallocation of workers
from sectors in decline to sectors on the rise, risks
being largely irrelevant until the economy picks up
again.  In the short run, flexibility will merely mean
that people lose their jobs more quickly. Second,
some of the more flexible economies like the US, the
UK and Ireland have been hit particularly severely
by the crisis. Taken together, this is likely to lead to
a situation where, empirically, the increase in
unemployment as a result of the crisis will be
greater in countries with more flexible labour
markets. 
But this is only half the story. Not only will the
benefits of flexibility be called into question by a
public whose trust in conventional economic
wisdom has been weakened by the crisis, the
promise of security to cushion the adverse effects
of greater flexibility will also rapidly lose credibility
in view of rapidly mounting public debt, severely
curtailing the ability of governments to offer more
substantial support and economic security to those
who lose their jobs. In particular, countries such as
the UK and Ireland which are going through a period
of severe fiscal stress and have low levels of
protection may find it difficult to sustain – let alone
increase – their level of protection. Overall, there is
a risk that flexicurity will come to be regarded as a
fair-weather arrangement unable to withstand the
current stress test. 
Only once the economy recovers will the
substantial benefits of flexibility in the labour
market once again become apparent. The reason is
that, when the recovery starts, typically certain
companies and sectors will expand while others will
continue to stagnate or even shrink. The speed and
extent of recovery will therefore depend crucially on
the ease with which workers can be reallocated to
the expanding sectors. If instead workers are tied
up in government-subsidised sectors in decline, or
have left the workforce altogether through early
retirement schemes, growth risks being stifled. 
In light of these likely developments, you will be
confronted immediately you take office with
perhaps the most important strategic decision of
your tenure: whether actively to promote an
ambitious flexicurity agenda against the odds
outline above. Or whether to shift emphasis and
attempt to develop a less controversial agenda
based on longer-term challenges such as ageing
and migration that also have a crisis dimension.
Before taking the decision, you should explore with
member states to what extent they would be
prepared to support greater EU involvement in the
flexicurity agenda. There are at least two reasons
why member states could find this attractive.
First, they may have an interest in creating a link
between, on the one hand, social and employment
policies and, on the other, the much-needed EU-
level agreement on a return to fiscal sustainability
within the framework of the Stability and Growth
Pact. Specifically, they may wish to see flexicurity-
type arrangements rewarded by interpreting a
higher percentage of post-crisis unemployment as
cyclical rather than structural, thus allowing for a
larger portion of their deficit also to be deemed
cyclical rather than structural. You should explore
this question with your colleague responsible for
economic and financial affairs upon assuming
office.
Second, member states may find a European
agreement in support of flexicurity helpful not only
to sustain social security-related fiscal
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but also politically to anchor labour-market
flexibility. This could be helpful for national
governments because they know that, once growth
returns, the rewards of flexibility in terms of job
creation are likely to return more rapidly than
political support for such flexibility. 
Such an intensified flexicurity agenda would have
carefully to balance the flexibility and security
elements. In addition, it would have to be
sufficiently versatile to be meaningful within the
great variety of social models present in Europe
today. It would certainly have to be backed up not
only by the open method of coordination but also
by supporting reforms of the ESF and significant
legislative action to achieve credibility and bite.
On the security side, a focus on minimum work
income – also sometimes called workfare – could
be an attractive alternative to approaches focused
on the contentious issue of the minimum wage. The
minimum work income would of course be defined
and financed at the national level. Technically, it
would be achieved by national governments
topping up the market wage of low-paid workers.
These benefits would then be withdrawn gradually
as incomes rise. While the mechanics of such
schemes will always have to be tailored to the
institutional characteristics of national welfare
states, the creation of a common framework and a
joint social commitment at the European level
could go a long way towards balancing the
efficiency and equity objectives of the flexicurity
agenda in a climate of post-crisis mass
unemployment.
EU unemployment is likely to peak in 2010. The situation on European
labour markets may destroy the most important conceptual pillar of
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An alternative focus
IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE that an ambitious
flexicurity agenda as previously described will
receive insufficient support from member states,
not least due to the different speeds of post-crisis
recovery and the differences in outlook that this
may entail.  In this case, you should explicitly note
that member states have, for the time being, made
the conscious choice to deal with the upcoming
unemployment challenge predominantly at the
national level without substantive  EU involvement.
The alternative course of action is to pursue an
agenda which would be somewhat lower key. It
should focus on two areas that have a pressing
crisis dimension while also being decisive for the
longer-term future of the EU:ageing and migration. 
Ageing and retirement: Politically, it will be almost
unavoidable that some countries use early-
retirement schemes to buffer the labour-market
impact of the crisis. However, this would not only
hamper the prospect of an economic rebound after
the crisis. It would also add substantially to the
problem of fiscal sustainability when debt levels are
already soaring. Therefore, it is essential that you
collaborate closely with your colleague in charge of
economic and financial affairs to develop EU-level
arrangements which recognise the contribution to
fiscal sustainability of increases in the effective
retirement age and which, conversely, impose
tighter demands for fiscal consolidation on
countries that once again fall into the early-
retirement trap. You will have a critical role to play in
this initiative, developing best-practice
arrangements for re-integration of older workers
into the labour market once the economy picks up
again.
Migration: To emerge from the current phase of
‘destructive destruction’ in the economy, European
economies need to move to Schumpeterian
‘creative destruction’, where some dynamic sectors
start to pick up the slack. Regaining the path to
growth would be helped in no small measure if the
EU could attract significantly more creative and
entrepreneurial talent from abroad. Unfortunately,
Europe is traditionally no leader in the global
competition for talent. To better position the EU, you
should strive to convert the EU’s Blue Card from
being merely a symbolic achievement to being a
real success story on the ground. This would, in
particular, require the Blue Card to become truly
portable within the EU, and to offer a much more
secure prospect of long-term residence than at
present. Thus, the agenda for ‘mobility
partnerships’ with the EU’s neighbourhood should
be significantly broadened: they should no longer
be narrow repatriation exercises but should include
a broader ‘skill-mixing’ agenda. Given the rise in
unemployment, the migration agenda will have to
be implemented against the backdrop of a ‘heads-
you-win-tails-I-lose’ fallacy: migrants will be
accused of t aking jobs from natives if they keep
their jobs and they will be accused of living off
(native) taxpayers’ money if they lose their jobs.
You will have forcefully to address this fallacy. 
Mobility: As the remaining transitional
arrangements imposed on the new member states
for the free movement of workers within the EU
expire, the issue of portability of social entitlements
should once again be at the centre of EU efforts to
build an effective EU labour market. Traditionally,
the approach has been to make pre-existing
national social insurance schemes portable to the
extent that this is feasible. This approach has now
largely run its course, encountering increasing
It will be almost unavoidable that some countries use early-retirement
schemes to buffer the labour-market impact of the crisis, hampering the
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difficulties as there are many aspects of national
schemes that may intrinsically resist portability,
such as maximum or minimum pension rules or
certain features of health or long-term care
insurance. Therefore, a new and somewhat more
invasive agenda will be needed that creates strong
incentives for member states increasingly to
replace characteristics of the welfare state that
resist portability.
ESF: Only in case an ambitious flexicurity agenda
were to be pursued might the ESF be needed as a
sizeable bargaining chip. In the lower-key scenario,
it would instead be recommended to decentralise
decision-making on the use of ESF funds much
more, while centralising the monitoring and
evaluation functions somewhat more. Specifically,
ESF spending could move increasingly towards
block grants, thereby leaving the geographic
distribution of the funds largely untouched while
paying heed to the subsidiarity principle. However,
such a move should be complemented by a much
stronger monitoring and evaluation role for the
Commission. Such credible ex-post controls would
not only help with joint learning on what works well
and what does not. It would also create much better
incentives for member states to spend EU
taxpayers’ money wisely.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 78bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 79
To: The Commissioner for Enlargement and
Neighbourhood Policy
From: Zsolt Darvas
Subject: Priorities for your term of office
Date: 1 September 2009bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 80
State of affairs
EUROPE CAN BE VERY PROUD of the completed fifth
enlargement round. It has not just unified most of
historically divided Europe, promoted democracy,
the rule of law, protection of human rights, market-
oriented reforms and helped to preserve security
and stability in Europe, but it has also brought
higher GDP, boosted the competitiveness of the
whole EU and enhanced the role of the EU as a
global player. Most of the initial fears surrounding
the eastern enlargement have not materialised – in
particular, although mobility from East to West was
sizeable, there has been no mass exodus, and
European institutions have continued to function
reasonably smoothly. However, beyond the current
borders of the EU, significant tensions and risks
persist. Some have indeed emerged more recently. 
Apart from Croatia, countries in south-eastern
Europe that have either candidate or potential
candidate status are caught between slow
domestic progress and mixed signals arriving from
the EU. Talks with Turkey are practically frozen.
Deterioration in its EU prospects has led to a
deceleration in the reform effort and also to a
change in public opinion. For example, according to
a Eurobarometer survey 71 percent of Turks
thought that membership of the EU would be good
for their country in the spring of 2004, but this
support had declined to 42 percent by the autumn
of 2008. Influential political leaders in some EU
countries have become mired in a sterile public
demonstration of ‘enlargement fatigue’. The voice of
other member states and of the Commission
reaffirming that it is progress that matters is less
audible. The results of the June 2009 European
elections were also taken to imply that the
prospects of further enlargement after Croatia and
perhaps Iceland are fading. 
The progress of countries at the EU’s eastern
border, at least those that have decade-long
dreams of moving closer to the EU, is also stalled by
enlargement fatigue, despite efforts from the EU
side such as the Eastern Partnerships (EaP). These
countries have a long way to go to shed their
remaining Soviet economic and political legacies
and also to resolve conflicts. Their situation is
certainly complicated by the foreign policy
objectives of Russia, a country that does not share
all Europe’s values but is keen on maintaining and
recovering its influence in the region. 
With the arrival of the crisis in south-eastern and
eastern Europe from the West in the autumn of
2008, the short-term risk of rising poverty and the
long-term risk of permanently reduced growth
prospects have emerged. Economic damage to
these neighbours will have serious repercussions
for the EU in the form of instability at its borders and
illegal migration.
Neighbours on the southern rim of the
Mediterranean are generally characterised by
unresolved conflicts, authoritarian regimes,
terrorist risk, slow progress even in non-political
areas such as improving regulatory quality.
Alleviation of these problems should be high on
your agenda, and the new ‘Barcelona Process:
Union for the Mediterranean’ (BP-UfM)’ initiative
should not be allowed to lapse into being a second
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, whose
performance has been disappointing.
Neighbours on the southern rim of the Mediterranean are characterised
by unresolved conflicts, authoritarian regimes and terrorist risk.
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Challenges
YOU WILL FACE TWO PRINCIPAL CHALLENGES
regarding the whole EU neighbourhood, whether the
countries are prospective EU member states or not.
The first challenge is more of an economic one and
is related to the eastern and south-eastern
neighbours, while the second one is more political
and has a bearing on the whole neighbourhood:
1. How to help neighbouring countries to cope with
the crisis and return to a sound economic growth
path after the crisis, so as to save Europe from
the increased risk of instability at its borders and
a potential flood of illegal migrants;
2. How to help them to maintain their political
orientation towards the EU in order to promote
the adoption of EU norms and the sharing of EU
values.
To provide a starting point for addressing these
issues, the table below provides a brief comparison
of EU and neighbourhood countries in terms of
some general indicators, some indicators related to
the EU’s Copenhagen criteria, and some indicators
related to the crisis.
In terms of the indicators related to the Copenhagen
E
U
1
5
N
M
S
1
2
C
r
o
a
t
i
a
M
a
c
e
d
o
n
i
a
,
F
Y
R
T
u
r
k
e
y
I
c
e
l
a
n
d
W
e
s
t
B
a
l
k
a
n
-
4
E
a
P
-
6
M
e
d
-
1
0
Population (millions), 2007 391.1 103.2 4.4 2.0 73.9 0.3 14.9 75.8 187.3
GDP/capita at Purchasing Power
Standards, forecast for 2010* 100 54 56 28 38 108 28 23 21
Democracy, 2007* 100 96 92 92 82 102 90 54 15
Voice and accountability, 2007* 100 86 77 69 59 104 68 51 35
Rule of law, 2007* 100 73 67 54 66 115 52 47 61
Lack of corruption, 2008* 100 65 63 51 65 127 48 35 46
Economic Freedom index, 2007* 100 93 85 86 85 104 84 78 84
Cumulative GDP growth from
2000-2008 (percent) 16.1 47.4 42.9 23.9 41.3 36.4 53.2 93.1 43.9
Forecast of cumulative GDP
growth from 2008-2010
(percent)
-4.1 -3.2 -3.3 -1.0 -3.7 -10.8 -1.3 -3.1 6.6
Lack of vulnerability to political
and social unrest, 2009*
100 74  46 46 31 94 47 50 64
* EU15=100
Note: EU15: The 15 EU member states before 2004. NMS12: The 12 member states which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. West Balkan-
4: Albania, Bosnia/Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. EaP6: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine. Med10: Algeria,
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia.
Population refers to total population of the respective country group. All other figures are weighted averages (using population
weightings). All institutional/governance indicators were rescaled so that a higher figure indicates a better score and are expressed as
EU15=100; GDP per capita is also expressed as EU15=100. Due to different methodologies behind the various indicators, scores across
indicators are not necessarily comparable, eg a 50-percent score relative to EU15 on one indicator may give rise to a different
interpretation than the same score on another indicator. 
Source: Bruegel calculations based on data from Eurostat, Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research, Freedom House, Economic
Freedom Network, Transparency International, World Bank, Economic Intelligence Unit, the April 2009 forecasts of the European
Commission’s DG ECFIN, and the IMF.
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criteria, Iceland clearly stands out, Croatia ranks
close to the average of the 12 new member states,
but other countries have larger gaps. Statistical
evidence also supports the case that
institutional/governance indicators are very
persistent over time and hence countries ranking
low have a long way to go to close the gap with EU
member countries.
The table also highlights that pre-crisis economic
prosperity was indeed remarkable for the whole
neighbourhood area, but that the crisis has marked
a significant break with this trend in the eastern
and south-eastern neighbours. It is no solace that
the fall in GDP from 2008 to 2010 is expected to be
slightly less on average than in EU15. The
conclusion that there is no need to be more
concerned than about EU15 would be wrong:
1. Neighbourhood countries are poorer and hence
the same percentage fall in income represents a
more serious threat to poverty than in EU15; 
2. Group averages hide huge country-specific
differences. Any ‘weak link’ can have
destabilising effects on its neighbours as well; 
3. Neighbourhood countries are more vulnerable to
social and political unrest than western Europe.
This can block important reforms and, combined
with increasing poverty and anti-globalisation
sentiment, can result in greater popular support
for anti-western political parties. 
4. It should be acknowledged that the process of
integration with the EU itself also contributed to
the severity of the crisis. Pre-crisis capital
inflows, while beneficial to growth, also boosted
unsustainable credit and housing booms and
rising current-account deficits in many
neighbouring countries.
In the past decades the EU has provided an anchor
for transition countries and influenced to a
considerable extent the design of their economic
and political institutions. The sudden realisation
that, in situations of stress, capital flows diminish,
trade collapses, protectionist policy rears its head,
migration inflows reverse and remittances dwindle
are major shocks that could lead to a rethink of past
policy choices and undermine support for the
market economy and EU orientation.
In Latin America, following a period of market-
oriented reforms along the lines of the ‘Washington
Consensus’ that emerged in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, globalisation and pro-market policies
became increasingly unpopular in many countries
and some of the pro-market reforms were reversed.
The economic literature concludes that the main
reason for this turnaround was that crises that
affected Latin America in the late 1990s and first
half of the 2000s were extremely costly and voters
associated these crisis episodes with market-
oriented reforms and the opening up their
economies. The risk that the current crisis will have
a similar effect on some EU neighbourhood
countries is non-negligible.
It is against this background that you should ask
the question whether the available tools and their
current use are sufficient to address the key
challenges. The symptoms and risks discussed so
far suggest that action should be sincere and bold.
Your political margin for manoeuvre will be very
limited. Member states are struggling with internal
problems, and enlargement and neighbourhood
policies have always been among the most
sensitive issues. As some new initiatives, such as
the BP-UfM and the EaP have been launched
recently, both the need and the appetite for any
brand new scheme may be very limited. EU public
opinion generally reflects enlargement fatigue, and
the EU’s popularity has taken a hit among the
citizens of neighbourhood countries.
Under these circumstances you should and can
play the role of a strategic thinker, a strong leader in
driving neighbourhood issues forward, an effective
communicator and an honest broker among EU
institutions, member states and neighbourhood
countries. You cannot afford to remain trapped by
current political realities and not look forward. 
You should find better ways to promote positive
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enlargement fatigue in the West, reform fatigue in
the East, and the resulting drop in prosperity at the
EU borders.  The policy options available for dealing
with  eastern and the south-eastern Europe on the
one hand and with the southern Mediterranean rim
on the other differ, in part because of the crisis and
in part because of geography. 
For the crisis-troubled eastern neighbours, a vital
short-term option is to revive the EU’s macro-
financial assistance instrument to third countries.
The loans disbursed under this facility have
declined to a few million euros over the last few
years. In contrast, the EU swiftly increased the limit
of the balance-of-payments facility for non-euro
area member states from €12 billion to €50 billion
recently. There is no doubt that EU member states
should be given priority, but the relatively paltry
facility for third countries sends the wrong
message to the neighbourhood. The respectable
US$100 billion European boost to the IMF
resources does not alleviate the need for a
substantial increase in this facility, because direct
support from the EU would also have a strong
signalling effect. In the neighbourhood countries
under the IMF programme there is more talk about
the IMF than about the EU, which must be changed,
since the EU’s stand during the crisis will have far-
reaching consequences for the relations of the EU
with partner countries. Within the EU, the difference
between extending a loan and granting aid should
be clearly communicated.
Regarding medium-term policies, there are
basically three options, of which the last one
applies only to European neighbours deemed to be
part of geographical Europe.
The easiest option is to go ahead with the current
instruments along the lines of the European
Neighbourhood Policy, the pre-accession strategy
and the enlargement process, with some fine-
tuning. These policy areas have many very positive
initiatives, such as the deep and comprehensive
free-trade area (DCFTA) envisaged in the recent
EaP, though this was set as a distant goal for most
of the countries in exchange for exhaustive
reforms. For other fundamental EU freedoms, the
initiatives were strongly constrained by current
political realities. For example, in terms of mobility
the EaP policy paper explicitly uses the phrase
‘long-term goal’ for full visa liberalisation and not
just the notion of strict conditionality, and also
relegates migration issues to the general
framework of the EU’s ‘Global Approach to
Migration’. Similarly, enlargement documents for
currently recognised candidates suggest, as the
Commission itself has noted, that the process is
proceeding like a ‘local train’.
The key question is whether the current initiatives,
coupled with the various formal and informal
messages from the EU side about the slowness of
the process, provide sufficient incentives for
neighbourhood countries to take the hard and
painful road of reform. The recent EaP, for example,
was received by one country concerned as ‘good
but not good enough’, another regarded it as
‘modest’, while  a third expressed its gratitude but
made it clear that it will not change its attitude and
can proceed to pursue its own objectives even
without the EU.
Perceptions are important. If politicians and
citizens in the neighbourhood do not regard the EU
as attractive enough, there is a serious risk that the
You should find better ways to promote positive incentives to break
the vicious circle of enlargement fatigue in the West, reform fatigue
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warning signs discussed so far will persist and that
a Latin-American scenario could emerge, ultimately
leading to less prosperity, security and stability at
the borders of the EU, with all the associated
consequences. 
A second option for you, therefore, is to promote
and lead a discussion to extend the scope of all
regional neighbourhood policies to include all four
EU freedoms, applying strict conditionality, without
any timescale or advance commitment, but
nevertheless offering a clear prospect of success.
First steps in this direction could be to set more
ambitious targets for visa liberalisation, as it would
instantly improve the image of the EU in the
neighbourhood, and to ensure the intra-EU
portability of the Blue Card, also providing for the
possibility of longer-term residence (see Jakob von
Weizsäcker’s suggestions to the new EU
Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and
Equal Opportunities). For the currently recognised
candidates, speeding up the EU-entry procedure
should be high on the agenda, but again applying
strict conditionality, without any particular
timescale or upfront commitment but with clear
prospects if conditions are met. 
A third option for you would be a radical rethink of
attitudes to neighbourhood countries: promoting
and leading a discussion on abolishing the dividing
line between ‘potential candidate’ and ‘other’
European neighbourhood countries. Again, this
approach need not involve any upfront
commitment, or even any active encouragement,
but should imply a clear prospect of EU entry
subject to the conditions set being met. 
The EU has always been keen on applying a rule-
based equal-treatment principle in its other policy
areas. The dividing line between potential
candidate and other European countries suggests
that enlargement is an exception to this rule,
despite the fact that Article 49 of the EU Treaty
states that ‘Any European State which respects the
principles set out in Article 6(1) may apply to
become a member of the Union’. The discrimination
between potential candidates and other countries
sends a very strong message to the people of most
of the neighbourhood countries that they should
give up any hope of EU accession in the long term
even if they succeed in meeting all relevant criteria,
irrespective of what is written in the treaty. 
Promoting and leading a fact-based discussion on
this issue would be a worthy initiative. The
discussion should stress that meeting the
accession criteria is a job which lies mostly with the
applicant country itself and that all applicant
countries (apart from Croatia and perhaps Iceland)
have a long, hard road to go in order to meet the
criteria. The discussion should also explore the
potential beneficial effects of abolishing the current
difference in status between neighbourhood
countries and what these beneficial effects would
imply for the EU.
Any of the three options, but especially the second
and the third, should be accompanied by an
institutional change within the Commission:
unification of the enlargement and neighbourhood
policies not only under a single commissioner but
also under a single Directorate-General. This change
is dictated by professional and political
considerations and by reasons of efficiency.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 85
Recommendations
FIRST, YOU SHOULD PROPOSE a substantial
extension of, and active use of, the macro-financial
assistance instrument to third countries.
Second, you should keep the reform momentum
going – or rekindle it – in all EU neighbourhood
countries by:
• Leading a comprehensive and strategic joint
review of both enlargement and neighbourhood
policies, including the possible extension
(subject to proper conditionality) of all four EU
fundamental freedoms to neighbourhood
countries and a re-examination of the issue of
the EU’s integration capacity;
• Applying the enlargement criteria to any and all
applicants in a transparent, tough but objective
way with the same standards as in the past,
while also making it clear to candidates that the
prospects for, and timing of, EU entry depend
exclusively on their own preparedness for
accession;
• Communicating more effectively and providing
more information about past and prospective
enlargements and neighbourhood issues to the
citizens of both the EU and neighbourhood
countries;
• Pushing the EU, not just the Commission, to
speak with one voice on enlargement and
neighbourhood issues, or at least to avoid
contradictions by adhering to a sprachregelung
acceptable to all. 
Third, enlargement and neighbourhood policies
should be combined within a single Directorate-
General.
Discrimination between potential candidates and other countries
sends a very strong message to the neighbourhood countries that
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To: The Commissioner for Trade
From: André Sapir
Subject: Priorities for your term of office
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State of affairs
BETWEEN 1998 AND 2008 the volume of world
trade grew at an average annual rate of nearly six
percent, twice as fast as world GDP. In 2009 the
collapse of global demand brought about by the
economic and financial crisis will, according to the
WTO, result in a decline in world trade of 10 percent,
the largest such contraction since World War Two.
The decline will be especially severe in developed
countries, including in the EU, with exports falling
by more than 10 percent. In developing countries
exports will contract by three to four percent.  
This dramatic turn of events raises two questions
for the multilateral trading system and for the
European Union, the largest trading bloc in the
world with an overall (export plus import) share in
world trade (in goods and services) of nearly 20
percent in 2008, well ahead of the US (15 percent)
in second place and China (10 percent) in third*.
The first question concerns the future of the Doha
Development Agenda (DDA), originally launched in
November 2001, which in June 2009 became the
longest running GATT/WTO trade round. Will the
crisis help to accelerate the pace of negotiations, or
will it instead make a deal impossible to achieve in
the immediate future? A broader question concerns
the very future of the WTO and the multilateral
trading system, a matter which goes much further
than the fate of the Doha Round.
The second question deals with the position of the
European Union on a number of issues crucial both
for us and for the multilateral trading system, of
which we are an avowed and staunch supporter.
Two issues stand out: trade and climate change,
and preferential trade agreements.
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Challenges
YOUR FIRST CHALLENGE will obviously be the
economic and financial crisis. Even if growth
restarts in 2010, next year is likely to see record
unemployment in Europe and elsewhere, which will
bring mounting protectionist pressures. This will be
a testing time for our trade policy and for the
multilateral trading system.
The next three challenges to Europe’s trade policy
relate to three issues likely to shape the future of
the multilateral trading system. 
Your second challenge is the role of emerging and
other developing countries, which form the majority
of WTO members and have also become important
players. Back in 1995, when the WTO was created,
the four leading exporters of goods were still the so-
called ‘Quad countries’ of Canada, the EU, Japan and
the US, which together accounted for 52 percent of
world trade. By 2008, their share was barely 37
percent, whereas the share of the ‘BRICs’ (Brazil,
Russia, India and China) had increased from eight
to 18 percent.  
During the 1999 Seattle WTO Ministerial
Conference, one of your predecessors, Pascal
Lamy, famously declared that the WTO was
‘medieval’. He was right. The Quad, that cosy club of
old powers, basically set the agenda of the World
Trade Organisation, as it had done for many years
with its predecessor, the GATT. But what Lamy was
describing was in fact an ancient regime about to
change. In 2001, China became a member of the
WTO, and by the time of the 2003 Cancun WTO
Ministerial Conference, it had joined forces with
Brazil, India, and South Africa to create a powerful
coalition of twenty emerging trading countries,
which together account for about the same share of
world trade as the European Union. 
The WTO basically works by consensus. This makes
negotiations among its increasing number and
variety of members highly problematic. Prior to the
Uruguay Round, there were two ways of dealing
with the diversity of interests among members. One
was to grant ‘special and differential treatment’
(S&D) to developing countries, which essentially
allows them to make fewer concessions, if any, in
exchange for trade benefits than other countries.
The second was to allow any country to remain
outside certain specific agreements. The Uruguay
Round sought to reduce these two flexibilities. First,
it introduced a distinction between developing and
least-developed countries in the application of S&D
measures aimed at increasing the participation of
emerging countries in the trade bargaining process.
Second, it established, at the EU’s insistence, the
notion of a ‘single undertaking’, whereby members
of the WTO would be required to accept the results
of a trade round as a package. One of the results of
this provision was to force developing countries to
become members of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) despite their reluctance to do so, a
situation only partly alleviated by the presence of
S&D clauses.        
The TRIPS arm-twisting episode still leaves a bitter
taste in the mouth of developing countries, a feeling
intensified in the late 1990s when the EU and the
US separately attempted to extend the ‘trade-and-
IPR-rules’ linkage concept to rules on labour,
environment, investment and competition. Efforts
to include ‘trade and labour’ on the agenda of the
future trade round discussed in Seattle was, in fact,
the main reason why developing countries
torpedoed the 1999 conference. Launching the
Doha Round two years later entailed labelling it a
‘Development Agenda’, although one never clearly
defined.
These clashes between industrialised and
developing countries need to be borne in mind in
tackling your third challenge: the role of trade rules
in the post-Kyoto global climate change regime.
Climate change is an issue where the
environmental objectives are fundamental, but
where the trade-offs with other objectives are
perceived differently across countries, in particular
(but not only) between industrialised and
developing countries. Different approaches to
resolving the tensions between environmental and
competitiveness concerns are likely to lead
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local industries at the expense of foreign suppliers
through border taxes or other instruments. Several
countries, including the EU, have for several years
been discussing trade measures against ‘dirty’
imports, which might even be WTO-legal under GATT
Article XX, which allows countries to take measures
to protect ‘human, animal or plant life or health’. No
such measure has yet been taken, but their use in
the future could lead to trade wars and unravel the
multilateral trading system, unless they were
embedded in new multilateral obligations. Much will
depend, however, of the capacity of countries to
reach a scientifically-credible and equitable deal at
the Copenhagen summit later this year.  
The fourth challenge relates to the proliferation of
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and the risk
of fragmenting the multilateral trading system into
regional blocs. 
The EU only applies the full ‘most-favoured-nation’
(MFN) tariff to nine countries (Australia, Canada,
Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore,
Taiwan and the US). All other countries receive
either unilateral or reciprocal preferential
treatment. The unilateral regime is available to
nearly all developing countries through the EU’s
Generalised System of Preferences (GSP). The
reciprocal regime covers the EU’s preferential trade
agreements (PTAs), which provide free trade in
non-agricultural goods, and limited liberalisation of
trade in agricultural products. Some agreements
also cover trade in services. The EU has PTAs with
nearly all European countries and with a number of
non-European partners (ACP countries, Chile,
Mexico, Mediterranean countries, South Africa). It
has also launched PTA negotiations with several
regional groupings (ASEAN, Central America, Gulf
Cooperation Council, MERCOSUR) and individual
countries (Canada, India, Korea, Ukraine). 
All the EU PTAs include subject-matter already
covered by the existing WTO Agreement, and
generally involve commitments going beyond
multilateral obligations, such as lower-than-MFN
tariffs, especially in non-agricultural goods. In
contrast to US PTAs, however, only few EU PTAs
cover trade in services. Many recent EU PTAs, and
all those currently being negotiated, also include a
number of regulatory matters that are outside the
WTO Agreements altogether, such as competition
and investment norms.
It is not only the EU which is crafting a network of
PTAs. The United States, Japan, China and every
other WTO country are engaged in similar activities.
The result is not only a welcome process of trade
liberalisation but also the creation of a vast
‘spaghetti bowl’ of discriminatory rules and
regulations, which tend to work in favour of large
‘hubs’ such as the EU, the US or China and against
the interests of smaller, often developing, trading
nations. The discriminatory dimension of such
agreements is further reinforced by the fact that
many recent PTAs include subject-matter not
currently covered by the WTO Agreements. 
Besides the crisis and the three challenges to the
future of the multilateral trading system, the EU’s
trade policy confronts a fifth challenge which
concerns its domestic organisation. Almost by
definition, trade policy is highly distortive and
subject to strong interest-group pressures. Trade-
protection measures bring benefits to some
domestic interests and costs to others. Typically,
benefits accrue to a small group of well-organised
The aggregation across interest groups of the costs and benefits of EU
trade policy has been entirely in the hands of the Commission and the
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producers, while costs are borne by a large group of
poorly organised consumers. What makes this by
and large politically feasible is that each producer
accrues a large gain, while each consumer bears
only a small cost. Moreover consumers may not
even be aware of the cost they bear, unless they
are themselves producers or distributors, who also
tend to be well organised. This explains why final
consumer goods such as food or apparel and
c l o t h i n g  t e n d  t o  b e  m u c h  m o r e  p r o t e c t e d  t h a n
intermediate products. 
So far, the aggregation across interest groups of the
various costs and benefits associated with EU trade
policy has been entirely in the hands of the
Commission and the Council, conducted through a
process that often lacks transparency, with votes
in the Council generally kept confidential. With the
Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament will gain
substantial power in the field of trade policy,
including in its ability to shape regulations defining
the framework for implementing EU trade-policy
measures. This is likely to have to have two impacts
on EU trade policy: greater transparency and
greater special-interest activity. 
These five challenges translate into five
recommendations.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 92
Recommendations
FIRST, YOU WILL HAVE TO WORK hard with your
foreign partners in stemming the rise of
protectionism in the face of mounting economic
difficulties and in accelerating the pace of the Doha
Round negotiations with a view to reaching a final
agreement in 2010. Success in the DDA is our best
insurance policy against a rise in protectionism
that could otherwise emerge from high
unemployment and sizeable changes in exchange
rates. Concluding the DDA will help the EU to reduce
its trade protection in agriculture, which remains
very high.  In return, the EU will be able to improve
its access to foreign markets in non-agricultural
goods and services, which together account for 95
percent of EU exports*.
Second, you should assume that the DDA will be the
last traditional trade round. Even if trade
liberalisation continues after the Doha Round, it is
unlikely to take place through the kind of
multilateral negotiations we have been witnessing
for the past eight years. If the WTO were to lose this
role, could it find a new one besides being a tribunal
for trade-dispute settlement? You should therefore
immediately establish a high-level group tasked
with preparing a report on the EU’s vision for the
role and the functioning of the WTO post-Doha. 
Third, a new legislative package on climate policy
will be a priority for the new Commission. It may
include trade-restrictive measures, or the threat
thereof, against countries refusing to take binding
climate-policy action. It would be a mistake,
however, to introduce such measures unilaterally,
or simply in conjunction with the US and other
industrial countries, which would be aimed at
developing countries. Instead, you should work with
your G20 partners in developing multilateral trade
disciplines along the lines of the recently proposed
C o d e  o f  G o o d  W T O  P r a c t i c e  o n  G r e e n h o u s e  G a s
Emissions Control. This will be a subject where you
will have to negotiate not only with your foreign
partners, but also with our member states and with
your colleagues within the Commission, and above
all the commissioner responsible for climate
change policy, and obviously the president.  
Fourth, one reason why the WTO may lose its trade-
liberalisation role after Doha is the rise of PTAs, to
which the EU largely contributes. You should be
aware that our current strategy on preferential
trade agreements brings both short-term benefits
and long-term costs. The benefits come in the form
of mercantilist gains: improved market access and
the opportunity to export EU regulatory norms to
trading partners. The costs of ‘competitive
regionalism’ are a weakening of the WTO system
and the risk of fragmenting the world into
competing trade blocs. This calls for a rethink of EU
policy that your high-level group should reflect
upon. We should probably consider how we can
work with other major trading partners in
developing new multilateral guidelines to better
control the perverse effects of free-trade areas than
is the case under existing WTO rules. 
Fifth, you will have to work more closely than your
predecessors with the European Parliament, which
will probably push for greater transparency in our
internal EU trade policy process. You should
strongly support such an effort. You should also
seek to establish with Parliament a common vision
of what EU trade policy aims to achieve and how.
Trade policy is an important instrument for our
competitiveness. Freer trade and open markets are
essential ingredients for Europe’s prosperity.
Keeping global markets open will require a
continuous, strong commitment towards the
multilateral trading system on our part. Given that
vast the majority of WTO members are developing
countries, it will also dictate that EU trade and
development policies become more
complementary and, indeed, mutually enhancing
and supportive. 
* In 2007 non-agricultural goods accounted for 67 percent of exports, compared to 28 percent for services and only five percent
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To: The Commissioner for Development
From: Indhira Santos
Subject: Priorities for your term of office
Date: 1 September 2009bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 96
State of affairs
PROGRESS MADE IN THE LAST DECADE to reduce
global poverty and improve standards of living has
been remarkable. The share of people living in
extreme poverty has fallen from 42 percent in 1990
to 25 percent in 2005. But achievement of the
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015 –
a big milestone for the next Commission and the
international community – looks unlikely in the
poorest countries. Moreover, the economic and food
crises have shown that gains can be fragile. There
is, therefore, a long way to go in the fight against
poverty. 
The EU bears major responsibility in this task as a
key player in international development, providing
over half of all official development assistance
worldwide. The good news is that the EU is one of
the few actors with the necessary clout to affect the
development agenda related not only to poverty,
but also to climate change and global health.
Involvement of the EU in development policy has,
moreover, broad support among EU citizens and a
strong economic rationale. The bad news is,
however, that the governance and implementation
of EU development policy remains highly
fragmented: the responsibility for this policy area is
shared between the Commission and member
states, resulting in 28 development policies. The
Commission, as a result, plays a dual role as a
development actor itself – managing 20 percent of
EU aid in 2006 – and as the coordinator of member
states’ action in this field.
But complexity is not limited to the question of
shared competency. The task of aid agencies is
further complicated by the co-existence of multiple
objectives and weak performance assessment. The
presence of many donors within and outside the EU
and a broken accountability loop between providers
and beneficiaries make these challenges even
more daunting. To increase the effectiveness of EU
development policy, these issues must be (at least
partly) resolved.
Further difficulties arise from the ongoing changes
in the global economic order. The impressive
performance of developing countries in the last
decade, with average annual growth of six percent,
has brought their share of world GDP from 37
percent in 1999 to 45 percent in 2008. For Europe,
this means that developing countries are both
consumers and competitors, a source of unskilled
and skilled immigrants, partners in global issues
and contenders for global influence.  
The fates of the developed and the developing world
are as intertwined as ever. Development policy is
embedded in a broader foreign policy framework.
The links between trade, immigration and
development policy have long been acknowledged,
but the future promises even stronger interaction
with other areas such as international security. The
Lisbon Treaty explicitly provides for the
establishment of a new High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who
should play an important role in coordinating the
different aspects of EU political and economic
foreign policy.
In this environment, both the Commission and EU
member states have recently made a considerable
effort to improve development assistance,
particularly by enhancing ‘ownership’ on the part of
recipients and harmonising policies, objectives and
procedures. The MDGs, the Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness and, most recently, the Accra Agenda
for Action have changed international development
cooperation, challenging donors and partner
countries to find more effective ways of working
together. Similarly, a series of recent EU initiatives,
including the 2005 European Consensus on
Development, have added to the reform wave. 
These are steps in the right direction and you
should continue these efforts. However, they will
not suffice. The economic crisis, a fragmented
institutional environment, unmet aid commitments
and the rise of new economic powers will shape the
landscape of development policy in the EU over the
next five years. Addressing these issues matters
greatly for improving the value of aid and the
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Challenges
FIVE MAIN CHALLENGESin your job as Development
Commissioner stand out.
First challenge: assisting the poorest countries
during the crisis and beyond. The UN’s aid target of
0.7 percent of rich-country GNI remains distant,
with EU countries currently achieving 0.4 percent
on average. Only Sweden, Norway, Denmark,
Luxembourg and the Netherlands have reached the
target. Meeting aid commitments will become even
harder once one-off measures (such as debt relief)
– accounting for much of the increase in ODA in
recent years – have run their course.
The world economy is in recession. Poor countries
are experiencing a fall in exports, remittances and
capital flows while their own resources do not allow
for fiscal expansion. Last year’s food crisis already
threw millions into extreme poverty and the World
Bank estimates that the economic crisis will add 50
to 90 million poor in developing countries. Yet the
response of the international community has been
timid. According to Eurodad, out of the $1.1 trillion
in extra money for the international financial
institutions (IFIs) agreed by the G20, only $50
billion would go to the poorest countries. 
At the UN Conference on Financing for Development
in November 2008, donors underlined the need to
meet aid commitments, even in the midst of the
economic slowdown. Whether these promises will
be kept is still an open question, but previous
experience does not provide much hope. In the
early 1990s, aid from Finland, Norway, Sweden and
Japan dropped between ten and 62 percent in the
aftermath of financial crises. This time, Ireland
became the first major European country to
announce a cut in its aid budget. In a crisis,
maintaining aid levels is a critical challenge – one
that is likely to remain during the expected slow
recovery. Resisting pressure to limit aid budgets
will consume considerable political capital, but the
case for international aid as a policy in the self-
interest of Europe will need to be made more
audibly than ever. This should be a priority task for
the Commission – making sure that its own
commitments and those of member states are
respected. Moreover, it should use its weight in
international organisations to argue the case
strongly for prioritising assistance to the poorest
countries in crisis-related initiatives. 
A  s e c o n d  c h a l l e n g e  i s  t o  m a k e  E U  d e v e l o p m e n t
policy more efficient. As an aid agency and donor,
the Commission should have significant
advantages: in ensuring cohesion of EU policies, in
achieving economies of scale in development
programmes, in putting forward a development
policy that is freer from commercial, political and
historical considerations and in adopting a more
regional and global approach to development. Yet
its influence in setting the development agenda is
limited. Fulfilling its potential role as leader in this
field requires steps to be taken in two areas: i)
improving coherence with member states’
development policies and coordination of EU
actions; and ii) exploiting the Commission’s
comparative advantage in development aid.
Fostering coordination in terms of delivery and
implementation of development policy remains a
key challenge. Although important steps have been
taken towards this objective, more progress is
needed. Pooling resources under specific objectives
shared in the EU would help in simplifying aid
modalities and maximising economies of scale in
the collection of funds, monitoring and policy
discussions. While maintaining shared competency
in development policy, the Commission and
member states should strive for more efficient use
of resources which would generate the necessary
synergies among the different instruments,
policies and budgets. The objective is to benefit
from member states’ differing comparative
advantage in development assistance, reduce
fragmentation of EU development policies and
minimise the burden on recipient countries of
multiple and different negotiations and rules. 
Of course, playing the role of coordinator of EU
development policies and being a donor itself, the
Commission should find its niche. The Commission,
given its own experience with structural policies in
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worldwide, is in a unique position to follow a more
regional approach to development. This is
particularly needed in Africa, where internal
bottlenecks - especially in infrastructure - make it
difficult to exploit the potential gains from further
integration on the continent. One example of
positive cooperation is the West African Power Pool,
in which 14 governments seek to maximise the
supply of electricity at a regional level. 
A word of caution is needed here. Issues related to
global public goods – although inherent to
development – should be treated separately from
local and regional development assistance
programmes, since there is a risk that focusing
more attention on them will lead to a decrease in
traditional aid where a larger share of the benefits
accrue to recipient countries.  As for global public
goods, such as those related to climate change,
some environmental projects, infectious diseases
and security, the EU should push for a truly global
approach, empowering international institutions
such as the World Bank to play a larger role.
A third related challenge involves building and
exercising intellectual leadership in international
development. Today, the World Bank enjoys a near-
monopoly in intellectual debate on development,
even though the Commission is well placed to put
forward innovative ideas in this field and to
strengthen the link between development research
and policymaking. The new European Development
Report – focusing this year on failed states – is a
step in the right direction. It is designed to be an
annual research-led review of development issues
and a European counterpart to other major global
flagship reports. However, it is not really a
publication of the Commission but rather a report
outsourced to a team of researchers. As such, it
does not put forward the thoughts of Europe on
development issues, and thus the vacancy for a
rival powerhouse to the World Bank remains
unfilled.
The fourth test of your tenure is the need for
enhanced accountability of both donors and
recipients if the EU is to play a bigger and more
effective role and aid budgets are to be boosted to
levels commensurate with commitments. This is a
task in which others, while making progress, have
failed. Today, there is almost a complete lack of
independent evaluation of aid, leaving aid agencies
– including the Commission – unaware of
programme impact and unaccountable to the
public. Given the lack of clear incentives to carry out
project evaluation on the part of donors, recipient
countries and implementing agencies, and bearing
in mind the cost of carrying out evaluation, it is
necessary to set up an independent third party for
this task. Global efforts in this direction already
exist, including the International Initiative for
Impact Evaluation. These are meant not only to
improve the legitimacy of development
programmes at home but also to obtain valuable
insights for future policy. A more comprehensive
approach to development policy evaluation at the
European level is, therefore, urgently needed.
A fifth challenge concerns the changing landscape
in international development as new players come
onto the scene. For many decades, the US and the
EU have acted as a duopoly in the development
arena. However, the improved economic
performance of China and Middle Eastern countries
in particular, and renewed interest in ensuring
access to natural resources, means that
competition in international development – as in
trade or investment – is intensifying. The
newcomers’ role as donors, investors and key trade
partners for the poorest countries is potentially
beneficial but inevitably raises questions about
competing interests and about governance and
standards. The main challenge is, therefore, to
incorporate these new powers into donors’
discussions and into international initiatives in this
field.
These five challenges map into five policy
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Recommendations
1. AS A FIRST TASK, your efforts should be directed
towards strengthening support for least-
developed countries during the crisis and
beyond. Aid targets of 0.56 percent of GNI in
2010 and 0.7 percent by 2015 should be met
and disbursements of provisioned funds blocked
by procedural requirements accelerated.
2. For the Commission to improve efficiency in EU
development policy, a two-pillar strategy is
proposed:
Pillar I: Fostering synergies through EU
Development Initiatives. Moving forward, donor
harmonisation can be improved by creating EU
Development Initiatives, both by country and by
sector, in which member states pool their
available development funds in support of large
sector programmes – such as for education or
health –in particular countries. These initiatives
could first be explored through pilot
programmes. The pooled resources can be
managed by the Commission and initiatives
headed by a particular member state or group of
member states or the Commission itself and
modeled on existing ‘global’ programmes such
as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria
and the Fast Track Program for basic education. 
Pillar II: Increasing focus on regional public
goods. Within the EU Development Initiatives,
the Commission should focus on funding
regional public goods, especially in Africa.
Transnational infrastructure projects, including
roads but also social investments such as health
centres in border regions, can advance
economic and social integration in Africa where
markets are still largely fragmented. This can be
done in two steps: i) the Commission can
establish common reporting requirements for
the EU bilateral donors on their support of
regional projects, which could then be used to
assess the strengths and weaknesses of
regional initiatives; and ii) in addition to the
Commission, individual member states or
groups of member states can put special
emphasis on strengthening regional
programmes, as the UK and France often do, for
example, in sub-Saharan Africa. 
3. For the Commission to realise its full potential
as a development actor, it needs to strengthen
its intellectual credentials. It clearly has the
potential to become an intellectual powerhouse
in international development and a ‘knowledge
agency’. A proper research department in the
Commission’s Directorate-General for
Development should be established, with the
objective of developing an in-house European
development paradigm and spreading best
practice in development policy. In particular, you
should create a position of Chief Development
Economist in charge of heading this effort.
4. Improved governance and accountability of
development assistance should remain a key
objective for the EU and the Commission.
Together with more aid, critical impact
assessments need to be carried out. It is
recommended that the Commission set up an
evaluation office within DG Development – the
EU Development Evaluation Group – to: i) pool a
fixed proportion of member states’ annual aid
disbursements (0.05 to 0.1 percent, for
example) to form an EU Independent Evaluation
Fund from which to contract out a small number
of evaluations every year; and ii) draw upon
these evaluations to formulate specific
recommendations and guidelines, giving priority
to broad public reporting and debate. 
5. Finally, the Commission should play an active
role in integrating China and other growing
economies into the donor world. In particular,
the Commission can take the lead in trying to
agree on a set of common global standards for
development assistance to ensure that aid
works for the long-term benefit of poor countries’
citizens. It should take the initiative, therefore, in
developing a code of conduct for donor
countries, specifying criteria for assistance
disbursements and best practice in development
policy.bruegel memos to the new commission 2009 100
About Bruegel
Bruegel is a European think tank devoted to international economics. It started operations in
Brussels in 2005 as a Belgian non-profit international organisation supported by European
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policymaking in Europe through open, facts-based and policy-relevant research, analysis and
discussion.
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nationalism and increasing cynicism about the power of government at any
level to be a force for the general good, the stakes for the next European
Commission are arguably higher than for any of its predecessors. To succeed,
it will have to set priorities right from day one. But faced with a plethora of
comment, analysis and advice even before the new commissioners assume
office, what key priorities should they focus on? 
As a contribution to sharpening this debate, Bruegel has decided to prepare a
set of open memoranda for the attention of the new Commission. One is
addressed to the president and eleven to individual commissioners in charge
of the most important economic policies at the EU level. These memos are
intended to be strategic. They do not spell out the whole agenda awaiting the
new Commission but describe succinctly the state of affairs, outline the key
challenges, and propose selected priorities.
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